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ABSTRACT
Purpose: To develop a better understanding of the personal readiness of Emergency
Department (ED) staff and senior nursing students with regard to managing a potential
bioterrorism incident.
Methods: A cross-sectional descriptive survey using the Bioterrorism Assessment Tool
was conducted to examine the factors influencing the knowledge pertaining to the health
care management of victims of bioterrorism amongst ED clinicians.
Findings: Universally a low level of awareness and knowledge was found in all groups.
Only one knowledge-influencing factor was found. The factor, internal awareness,
comprised of the participant self-report on personal and ED preparedness for a
bioterrorism attack entered into the model with a R2 of .062.
Conclusion: The sample was not prepared to deal with bioterrorism. This lack of
preparedness is impacted upon by the lack of awareness and knowledge ED clinicians
have with respect to bioterrorism casualty management.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Infectious diseases have killed people for as long as humankind can remember. In
the eleventh century, before the Common Era (BCE), man first recorded his dealings with
the plague in the area around Ashdod, Israel (Scully & Kohn, 2007). The pestilence
continued for many years until 400 BCE, when Scythian archers changed the course of
history by first using bacteria as a means of killing their enemies. They figured out that
by dipping their arrows in manure or decomposed bodies, the enemy would die more
viciously and in greater numbers. Since then, man has placed dead bodies in the drinking
water of his enemies; catapulted bubonic plague infected corpses over the walls of enemy
cities; and passed smallpox, plague, and yellow fever laced clothing to his enemies as
gifts with the intention of killing them (Smart, 1997).
The roots of terrorism are not clear, largely due to the fact that there is no
universal legal definition of terrorism or terrorist (Golder & Williams, 2004; Record,
2003). It is clear however that terrorism came about much later than infectious diseases,
around the late eighteenth century, with much attention brought to the subject since the
1970's (Halliday, 2001). Although governments have bantered about with the proposed
or actual use of biological agents in warfare, the concept of using biological agents as a
tool of terrorism against civilian populations is relatively recent. In 1972, the first
stockpile of a biological agent (typhoid) was found in the possession of a Chicago based
terrorist organization known as the Order of the Rising Sun. Their intention was to create
a new master race by contaminating the water supplies of various cities (Andersen, 2003;
Paquette, 2004).
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Significance of the Problem
The trend of finding people and terrorist organizations that threaten to use
biological agents has continued since the first discovery of 1972. In 1984, the first actual
use of a biological agent {Salmonella typhimurium) on North American soil went largely
unnoticed, despite the fact that it caused 751 casualties. The incident caused no worry or
panic in the North American health care community, largely because discovery of the
incident was untimely, novel, and classified by the government (Miller, Engelberg, &
Broad, 2001). This aforementioned incident was a clear demonstration that the problem
of biological terrorism was upon our society but no one noticed its significance or cared
to admit it due to the grandiosity of mitigating the situation should an attack occur
domestically. The failure to recognize that the threat was real continued despite numerous
expert reports on the subject (Hamburg, 1999; Henderson, 1998; Kortepeter & Parker,
1999; Purver, 1995; United States General Accounting Office [GAO], 2001). However,
the attitude toward the threat of biological terrorism changed on the 4th of October 2001
following the American anthrax mail attacks. Such a change in attitude toward the threat
of biological terrorism happened largely because the world was already at a heightened
state of alert following the 11th of September 2001 attacks by Al-Qaeda on the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon. The anthrax attacks that were launched through mailing
of envelopes contaminated with white powder lead to the victimization of 22 people and
exposed the lack of preparedness in both the health care community and various levels of
government. As a result, health care and government agencies were forced to take a
closer look at the likelihood of future biological attacks, the state of preparedness to deal
with such attacks, and identify the key stakeholders who would deal with future attacks.
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The assessment quickly revealed that the system was not ready to deal with the threat of
another biological terrorist attack.
Following the anthrax attacks, government agencies appeared to be dealing with
the potential of a biological terrorist attack more seriously. In fact, the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) released a list of potential biological agents that
terrorist organizations might use (Rotz, Khan, Lillibridge, Ostroff, & Hughes, 2002). The
American intelligence community also released reports pressing that the threat of another
biological terrorism event was impending (Anthrax Attacks, 2001; Cronin, 2003; United
States Central Intelligence Agency, 2003). However, despite these reports and the
heightened awareness of the potential of an attack, the ability to predict such attacks
remains an enormous task, if not an impossible one (Dembek, 2005). This is because an
attack can be launched at any scale and in various forms such as aerosol attacks (North
Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], 2000), postal mail attacks (Paquette, 2004), and/or
contamination of the food and water supply (Khan, Swerdlow, & Juranek, 2001). It is
also possible that terrorists could launch attacks using conventional explosives targeting
industrial, medical, and academic biological research facilities. Rail or land shipments of
biological materials also pose a potential target for the terrorist attempting to release
biological agents into the environment (Emergency Preparedness Canada, 1995).
In addition to the national security concerns over the potential of a bioterrorist
attack, the threat of such attacks poses an immense challenge to our health care system.
Thus, it is important that we be prepared to manage any bioterrorism scenario that may be
launched without a previous warning and that could affect a large portion of the
population. Any preparation undertaken needs to include public health epidemiological
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surveillance and training of health care personnel to safeguard themselves and the public.
It should also include a wide range of procedures and policies that would be initiated in
the event of an attack to limit the spread of infectious diseases within hospital settings,
effectively diagnose and treat the seldom seen diseases, administratively and logistically
prepare for management of large numbers of casualties, manage the mental health
sequelae that will likely follow an event, provide health information to the public at large,
and manage the mortuary issues surrounding the recently contaminated deceased
(Johnson-Winegar et al. 2005).
Despite the impact that a bioterrorist attack may have on the health care system
and the society at large, it is apparent the health care community currently has significant
gaps related to preparedness. This is largely because it is not clear if nurses and
physicians in Canadian emergency departments (EDs) have enough training pertaining to
the management of victims of bioterrorism. It is also not clear if they perceive the threat
of a biological attack to be real. In addition, such an attack is likely to catch clinicians by
surprise due to the inability to detect a covert release of biological agents. The impact of
a bioterrorism attack will be substantial as the Canadian population is immunologically
vulnerable due to the current lack of licensed vaccines against common biological
terrorism agents (Johnson-Winegar et al., 2005). The current state of laboratory
diagnostic capabilities in most hospitals will not support a timely diagnosis of rare and
seldom-encountered biological agents furthering the lack of readiness the health care
system has to deal with the threat. In fact, even when presenting conditions are finally
diagnosed, we are likely to experience lack of therapeutic agents to treat a potentially
overwhelming number of patients (Johnson-Winegar et al., 2005).
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Given that ED staff is the frontline of the health care system in the case of a largescale bioterrorist attack, it is particularly important that they be well prepared to deal with
such a potential. In the event of an overt attack, they will need to be able to deal with
victims contaminated with contagious agents and the psychological consequences that
result from the attack. If not prepared, clinicians may not be able to identify the actual
presence or type of biological agent in a timely manner and thus may endanger their own
health when they come in unprotected contact with victims. No matter what happens, ED
personnel need to be able to methodically decontaminate victims in order to render them
safe to enter the ED and prevent gross infrastructure contamination; effectively care for,
diagnose, and initiate treatment for a possible massing of patients; and even care for
concurrent traumatic blast injuries if an explosive device was used to disseminate the
biological agent. In addition, ED personnel are expected to manage the victims of a
biological terrorist act, while continuing to care for their regular ED patients that they
face on a daily basis (NATO, 1996). All these responsibilities highlight the importance of
providing ED clinicians with all the tools at our disposal to make sure that they are well
prepared to manage a bioterrorism emergency. They also highlight the importance of
ensuring that proper policy and procedures are put in place in all emergency departments
so that the response to such attacks be well coordinated and thought through.
Purpose of the Study
The general purpose of this study was to develop a better understanding of the
personal readiness of ED staff and senior nursing students with regard to dealing with and
managing a potential biological terrorist act. Specifically, the study explored: (a) the
training that health care providers who work in the ED (that is, nurses, physicians, and
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senior nursing students) have received with regard to the management of victims of
biological terrorism, (b) the current level of threat awareness and knowledge that these
health care providers possess with regard to the issue of biological terrorism, and (c) the
factors associated with the knowledge that ED health care providers have concerning the
management of victims of biological terrorism.
Relevance to Nursing
The disaster cycle represents the course of a disaster from start to finish, including
the prevention of disaster, preparation for disaster, the experience of the actual disaster
event, the response to the disaster, and the recovery from the disaster (Ciottone, 2006). It
provides a tool for the examination of the various features of disaster planning and
response, and thus is useful to registered nurses who play a significant role in the
planning and management of responses to disasters (Klein 2000; Langan, 2005;
Veenema, 2007a). One common responsibility that is often delegated to nurse
administrators is the writing of policy and procedures pertaining to the disaster
managements plan (Veenema, 2007a). In addition, nurse educators working the ED and
nurses academics are expected to teach nurses and other staff members about the proper
response to a disaster. This responsibility includes teaching about personal preparedness
skills such as N95 / N100 protective mask fitting, clinical management of the mass
casualties produced by a disaster, and coordinating disaster drills. Furthermore, nursing
academics are expected to carry out the responsibility of including the theoretical aspects
of disaster planning and management in university nursing programs (Stanley &
Veenema, 2007). Finally, emergency nurses, especially advanced practice emergency
nurses, have an important role and responsibility to conduct research related to disaster
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nursing (Canadian Nurses Association, 2002; Cole, 2000; Ricciardi, Griffin-Agazio,
Lavin, & Walker, 2007).
Preparing for a biological terrorist attack is one important subset of the overall set
of skills of disaster planning in emergency nursing. By having a good understanding of
the factors that influence the knowledge possessed by emergency nurses with regard to
managing victims of bioterrorism, we can better prepare them to deal with potential
attacks. Our ability to assess who amongst health care providers is knowledgeable in the
management of victims of biological terrorist acts is key to effective planning for
management of the consequences of an attack, educating nursing and other health care
providers, and conducting further research.
This study has a special significance to nurses working within the federal and
provincial governments as disaster planners. Occasionally, Canada hosts a wide variety
of important national and international events such as the G8 Summit, the Olympic
Games, the Summit of the Francophone Countries, and World Trade Organization
meetings. Such gatherings present high value targets for terrorists wishing to advance
their agenda by inflicting mass casualties. Thus, by having a tool to assess the local
emergency preparedness with respect to biological terrorism they can identify the
shortfalls in local ED clinician knowledge prior to the event. This in turn can result in
targeted training initiatives, federal resource tasking, and financial allocation targeted at
the identified vulnerabilities. These actions are critical to the processes of an effective
disaster preparedness program (Keim & Giannone, 2006).
The significance of this topic and research to emergency nurses is immense.
Nurses provide nursing care for individuals, families, and groups in various environments
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with the goal being to promote or preserve health (Fawcett, 1996). The emergency nurse
has an onus to provide the best possible care for clients and take action in a situation
where the client's well-being is threatened (College of Nurses of Ontario, 2002). This
includes the unfortunate client who arrives in the ED after exposure to the effects of
biological terrorism. Without proper situational awareness and training, victims of a
bioterrorism event will needlessly die, and nurses themselves may become casualties.
Conceptual Framework
The Canadian Forces (CF) Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) Defence
Framework was born out of the CF NBC defence strategic doctrine. It provides a
theoretical framework when preparing for operations in a NBC contaminated
environment (Ministry of National Defence [MND], 2005a). It is a tool for preparedness
and response that is congruent with Canadian national security policy, international
treaties, conventions, agreements to which Canada is a partner, command strategic
guidance, NBC weapons policies, counterterrorism policy, nuclear regulation and control
policy, CF industrial safety policy, and the considerations surrounding toxic industrial
materials (MND, 2005b; Privy Council Office, 2004). Although the use of this
framework is almost exclusively limited to the Ministry of National Defence, it has
applications outside the military context. Parts of the publication series of the framework
are dedicated to NBC defence during domestic operations and operational cooperation
with civilian agencies. However, although unused by civilian health planners, largely due
to its inaccessibility, it is appropriate for civilian use because of its strong substantive
foundations, structural integrity, and functional adequacy (Smith, 2003). This framework
relies on four core NBC defence principles, all equally important, which are enabled by
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five components (MND, 2005a). Figure 1 displays a model describing the relationships
amongst the four core concepts and the five components of the framework.
The Principle Concepts
Force preparation is the first concept and refers to the fact that all organizations
within the CF need to be prepared for a NBC event. This includes having plans,
equipment, procedures, organization, and training related to NBC defence. These are seen
as preliminary measures that are taken prior to exposure to a NBC event. Not only does
force preparation make the organization ready to operate in a NBC environment, it also
serves as a deterrent to potential enemies (MND, 2005a; United States Army, 2001). This
concept has existing parallels in civilian health care. Preparing for disasters through
planning, acquiring equipment, and training is not a new concept for emergency health
care providers (Keim & Giannone, 2006).
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Figure 1. The CF Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defence Framework (MND, 2005a)
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Risk management is the second concept and it allows commanders and planners to
focus on only the real risks that they may be facing. With an unimaginable number of
potential NBC scenarios existing, energy needs to be focused on the planning and
preparation for the most likely threats. This is a dynamic process and is ever evolving as
adversaries conjure up new tactics and equipment. When risks are anticipated, planned
for, and recognized, freedom of action is gained (MND, 2005a). The concept of risk
management in the ED setting is not new and is often employed as a strategy for the
mitigation of lawsuits due to adverse outcomes that commonly occur in the ED (White et
al., 2005). Risk management in the ED has been used in scenarios such as preparing for
violence (Bullard, Strack, & Scharoun, 2002; Knott, Bennett, Rawet, & Taylor, 2005)
and disaster planning (Levi, Micheaelson, Admi, Bregamn, & Bar-Nahor, 2002). The
principle of risk management is relevant for ED planners and clinicians when planning
for the management of biological terrorism. It helps clinicians and planners to understand
that they need not to be knowledgeable of every possible biological terrorism agent in the
terrorist's disposal, but rather focus only on those that possess a moderate to high
likelihood of use against the population.
Flexibility, integration, and cooperation compose the third principle of the
framework and make reference to the fact that an adversary has a say in how they attack
an organization and that this attack might not correspond with contingency plans. One of
the 10 principles of war, flexibility, allows the commander and her/his staff latitude in
preparing for and responding to an NBC event (MND, 2003; United Kingdom Ministry
of Defence, 2002). Integration and cooperation with other stakeholders in NBC defence
ensures a comprehensive interagency strategy against the threat (MND, 2005a).
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Sustainability is the fourth concept and accounts for the increased burden in terms
of personnel and supplies that will be consumed over the period of time following an
NBC event (MND, 2005a). This is important because once an NBC event has occurred
the management of the event will take place over an unknown and prolonged period of
time. Once again, this concept is an important concept for ED managers, and disaster
planners with respect to a biological terrorism event.
The Enablers
Five enablers (found in italics below) allow the aforementioned four framework
principles to be attained. Within the military, they provide for activities and tasks such as
planning, training, knowledge conveyance, personnel allocation, and funding. Without
focusing on the enablers, the principles would be large concepts that are too abstract to
manage in any practical sense.
Detection, identification, and monitoring allow the targeted organization the
ability to realize that a covert NBC attack is occurring. Concurrently, it allows the
biological agents deployed against the organization to be identified, the areas of
contamination to be delineated and monitored for any changes due to weathering of the
agents or the spread of contamination through natural or accidental causes (MND,
2005a). The equipment involved is often technologically complex, expensive, and is
seldom used outside of the military and hazardous materials detection team setting
(MND, 2005c). Although detection and identification technology have a clear use in the
detection and monitoring of potentially contaminated patients, and the testing of patients
after decontamination for confirmation of cleanliness, it is inappropriate to apply this
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concept to the civilian ED setting until the technology to carry out this enabler is widely
available.
Communication and information systems enable the organization affected by a
NBC attack to rapidly collect, evaluate, and disseminate information regarding the NBC
event (MND, 2005a). With the large volume of information required to manage a
biological terrorism event, the infrequency of the use of this information, and the speed in
which this information is required, this concept is relevant to ED staff.
The concept of personal protection from infectious diseases is not new in the ED,
and is commonly found as part of the departmental infection control policy (Wilson,
2006). It allows personnel who must operate in a NBC contaminated environment the
freedom to do so without the fear of illness or death. It encompasses activities such as the
selection and use of individual protective equipment (MND, 2005a). This enabler is
highly relevant to ED personnel who are faced with a biological terrorism incident.
Without the ability to protect oneself, health care providers risk physiological and
psychological harm and increase their chances of becoming casualties. Personal
protection provides physical and psychological barriers to the toxic environment, thus
allowing clinicians to retain some control over the presenting situation.
Hazard management is the process of limiting the impact that NBC agents have
on the population. This can be accomplished through hazard avoidance, control of hazard
spread, or decontamination (MND, 2005a). After an overt biological terrorism event,
emergency departments cannot lock out potential patients thus avoiding the hazard
altogether. Patients must be cared for inside the department, and hence the hazard must
be managed. This is accomplished through the decontamination of overt or suspected
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contamination and the isolation of infectious patients. Klein (2000) has discussed the
importance of decontamination in the ED setting. The concept of isolating infectious
patients is also commonly used in health care (Heymann, 2004; Wilson, 2006).
Medical countermeasures and medical support is an enabler that enhances the
success of the principle framework concepts. These activities include the medical
interventions taken in advance to minimize the impact of NBC agent exposure and the
evacuation and treatment of patients once they have been physiologically or
psychologically affected by NBC agents (MND, 2005a).
Use of the Framework
The CF NBC framework is an all-encompassing model for planning the response
to a NBC event. It was beyond the scope of this study to utilize the full model of
preparedness, and hence only parts of the framework that were directly relevant to this
study were used. With respect to the principal concepts, two of the four concepts were
utilized. These were the principles of force preparation and risk management. The
principle of force preparation had unique applications to this study as the study examined
the preparation of ED staff (that is, training and knowledge) prior to a biological
terrorism event. This principle when combined with the principle of risk management
forms an important aspect of the required knowledge that ED staff needs to possess.
Personal protection and hazard management, in terms of decontamination and isolation,
are two enablers that were of relevance to this study. In addition, the enabler that includes
information systems guided exploitation of the knowledge of accessibility that clinicians
may have for just-in-time information resources. The medical countermeasures enabler
was examined as a concept for the mandate of treatment after a biological terrorism
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attack. It is an important one for this thesis, and was examined with respect to the social
and the professional mandate for ED clinicians to provide care after a biological incident.
Research Questions
The study provided answers to the following research questions:
(1) What training do health care providers working in the ED (that is, nurses, physicians,
and senior nursing students) receive with regard to the treatment and management of
victims of biological terrorism?
(2) What is the current level of threat awareness with regard to the issue of biological
terrorism among health care providers?
(3) What are the factors associated with the knowledge of health care providers in the
ED concerning the management of victims of bioterrorism?
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Search Strategy
The proceeding literature was obtained through a systematic review of seven
databases: Proquest Nursing Journals, PubMed, Cumulative Index to Nursing and Allied
Health Literature, Medline, Ovid Nursing, Ovid HealthSTAR, and the Cochrane
Database of Systematic Reviews. Additionally, theses and dissertations stored in the
Proquest Dissertations and Theses database or Proquest Digital Dissertations database
were searched. Keywords used in the search process included biological, terrorism,
bioterrorism, nursing, nurse, physician, student, emergency, room, department,
preparedness, readiness, planning, knowledge, training, education, threat, and disaster.
These search terms were used in various combinations with Boolean logic operators. This
approach yielded 23 published articles and no theses or dissertations.
Bibliographies of books and reference lists of articles were scanned as part of the
literature identification process in order to find additional relevant articles or books. A
suggestion of literature to review was also provided by various experts in the field of
biological terrorism. This resulted in an additional 22 articles, 27 textbook chapters, and
nine complete textbooks. The completed literature review process yielded a total of 45
journal articles, 27 textbook chapters, and nine textbooks.
The Review
The Threat of Biological Terrorism
The literature reveals considerable concern for the possibility that terrorists may
commit further acts of terrorism using biological means. The threat of biological
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terrorism could come in many forms, could be executed for many reasons, and could be
perpetrated by a myriad of subversive parties. As succinctly put by Mr. Parachini, a
RAND Corporation policy analyst, who said in a testimony before a United States
congressional subcommittee on terrorism "Given our potential vulnerabilities, it is a
small wonder that states and terrorists have not used disease more often" (Anthrax
Attacks, 2001, p.2).
Since 1972, the Canadian intelligence community has extensively studied the
potential of biological terrorism occurring on Canadian soil. Government experts in the
field of intelligence threat assessment have concluded that the risk of a biological terrorist
attack occurring in Canada is real (Purver, 1995). Terrorists view Canada as an attractive
target because of its societal freedom, privilege, western world values, influence on the
political stage, and military operations overseas (Privy Council Office, 2004). Kollek
(2003) noted that, due to its proximity to the United States of America (USA), Canada
might be used as an attack staging area and may therefore be at risk for an accidental
biological agent release. An attack could also be directed at Canadian citizens simply as a
result of Canada's alliance with the USA (Kollek, 2003).
The literature also provided insight on the possible presentation of a biological
terrorist attack. It suggests that the risk of an attack using biological agents is lower than
that of an attack using conventional explosives (Anthrax Attacks, 2001; Artenstein,
2006). Should biological attacks occur, they would likely be small-scale in nature. Largescale attacks are not as probable because of the technical and operational challenges in
the actual delivery of biological agents (Anthrax Attacks, 2001; Artenstein, 2006).
Nonetheless, it is widely feared in the literature that a modestly well-funded terrorist
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organization could manufacture or acquire biological agents for dissemination (Inglesby,
O'Toole et al., 2002; Regis, 1999). In fact, the United States Department of Defense
undertook a study in which one million dollars was provided to three defence employees
who possessed technical skills, but who had no knowledge of biological weapons. In less
than one month, they were able to manufacture a biologic simulant of anthrax (Miller,
2001).
The literature widely indicated that biological agents could be disseminated in a
covert manner, without public awareness of the release, or in an overt manner where the
population is visibly contaminated with a biological agent (Landesman et al., 2001;
Paquette, 2004; Rubinson et al., 2005). The most probable means of terrorist biological
agent dissemination is via airborne release. The technology to facilitate aerosol
dissemination inside a building, or outside over a large area is currently commercially
available to the public (Paquette, 2004; Office of Technology Assessment, 1993; World
Health Organization [WHO], 1970). In an experimental study by Defence Research and
Development Canada (Kournikakis, Armour, Boulet, Spence, & Parsons, 2001),
investigators placed an anthrax simulant {Bacillus globigii) in various types of mail
envelopes and had people open them in a mock office environment equipped with
modern heating, ventilation, and air conditioning systems. When the airborne pattern of
agent dissemination was measured, the bacteria was detected over a considerable area,
revealing that even a low technology dissemination method such as spores in an envelope
can pose a significant health risk.
The literature identified that contamination of food and water sources are two
other methods of biological agent delivery. In these scenarios, a terrorist might
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purposefully add a biological agent into the food chain, or into public water supplies
(Paquette, 2004; Rotz et al., 2002). The vulnerability of the food chain and water supply
is largely due to the lack of physical protection afforded through public security
initiatives. Additionally, a terrorist entity may find these methods of contamination
favourable due to the ease of attack, the large geographic scope of dissemination, and low
probably of detection by the authorities until illness presents (Paquette, 2004).
It has been implicated that adversaries of the western world have the desire to use
biological agents against a civilian population. Three creditable examples were found in
the literature. These include the state that wants to attack another state by means of a
clandestine act, the state that provides biological agents to a sub-national terrorist group
to conduct an attack in order to maintain deniability, or the terrorist group which
produces a biological agent without the aid of a state (Anthrax Attacks, 2001). In 1991,
after the first war in Iraq, team members of a United Nations Special Commission found
evidence that Iraq had conducted research on anthrax, botulism toxin, and Clostridium
perfringens. This evidence was further confirmed in 1995 when United Nations
inspectors found a total of 19,000 L of Clostridium botulinum toxin, 8,500 L of anthrax,
and 2,200 L of aflatoxin (Miller, Engelberg et al., 2001; United States Army Institute of
Infectious Diseases [USAMRIID], 2005; Zilinskas, 1999). Currently, Al-Qaeda presents
a looming threat with respect to biological terrorism. In 1998, Osama Bin Laden publicly
declared that the acquisition of unconventional weapons by his followers was a religious
duty. This threat was followed in 1999 by attempts to acquire biological weapons in both
Sudan and Afghanistan, and a statement by a senior Bin Laden associate claiming that his
group has biological weapons. Further, bioterrorism related documents and equipment
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recovered from Al-Qaeda facilities in Afghanistan showed a level of sophistication that
was previously unsuspected (Boureston & Mahaffey, 2003; Paquette, 2004; United States
Department of State, 2002).
In 1992, Dr. Kanatjan Alibekov (who changed his name to Ken Alibek), a senior
biological warfare program manager who defected from Russia reported that Russia had
an active and robust biological warfare program. This included active research into
genetic engineering, binary biologicals, and the ability to manufacture large amounts of
biological agents. Although Russia is no longer a substantial threat, its displaced research
scientists (which once totaled 60,000 scientists) who have moved from the economically
crippled Russia to many other countries around the world present a real threat. The
location of these scientists is not completely known, but Libya, Iran, Syria, and North
Korea are known to have been actively recruiting ex-Russian scientific expertise. There is
a concern in the literature that we need not be worried only about rogue, expatriate
Russian scientists and their knowledge, but we should also worry about the possibility
that they have left Russia with biological cultures including smallpox (Alibek, 1999;
Anthrax Attacks, 2001; Henderson et al., 1999; Miller et al., 2001; USAMRIID, 2005).
Currently, between 13 and 17 nations, many of which are economically or politically
unstable, are reported to have active biological warfare programs (Center for
Nonproliferation Studies, 2002). The risk of terrorist acquisition of biological agents
from these inadequately protected stocks of weapon grade biological agents is higher than
ever (Paquette, 2004).
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History of Use and Attempted Use
The literature provided numerous examples of attempted or actual use of
biological agents for the purpose of terrorism. The first effective bioterrorism attack was
carried out in 1984 by members of a religious cult known as the Rajneeshees when
dissemination of salmonella {Salmonella typhimurium) in Oregon, USA resulted in 751
cases of salmonellosis. This outbreak was the direct result of the production and
distribution of the agent at 10 salad bars in order to affect the outcome of a local election
(Anthrax Attacks, 2001; Garrent, Magruder, & Molgard, 2001; Miller et al., 2001).
Anthrax {Bacillus anthracis) has been the most effectively used bioterrorist
weapon on American soil. In 2001, five letters containing anthrax arrived by public post
to three cities. These anthrax mailings resulted in 22 confirmed cases of anthrax, five
deaths, and prophylactic antibiotic treatment of 10,000 people (Inglesby, O'Toole et al,
2002; Paquette, 2004; USAMRIID, 2005). The strain of anthrax (Ames) used was a
highly sophisticated, military grade quality that contained a very high microbial density
of 100 billion to 1 trillion spores per gram (Anthrax Attacks, 2001; Inglesby, O'Toole et
al, 2002).
Although the successful use of a biological agent by terrorists is limited to the two
previously described events, many attempts to use biological agents as a tool of terrorism
have been described in the literature. These include an instance of a terrorist organization
in Chicago that possessed 30 to 40 kg of typhoid (Andersen, 2003; Paquette, 2004), four
instances where Ricin was found in the possession of a terrorist (Andersen, 2003, Garrent
et al., 2001, USAMRIID, 2005), one instance of plague {Yersinia pestis) possession
(Carse, 1998; Garrent et al., 2001; USAMRIID, 2005), and the attempts of the Japanese
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cult Aum Shinrikyo to use anthrax, botulism, Q fever and Ebola against the citizens of
Japan (Kaplan, 2000, Murakami, 1998/2000; Paquette, 2004; USAMRIID, 2005;
WuDunn, Miller, & Broad, 1998).
Potential Biological Agents Available for Use
The United States CDC conducted a landmark public review of biological agents
that could be employed as tools of terrorism (Rotz et al., 2002). Subsequently, they
developed critical biological agent categories for public health preparedness using a riskmatrix analysis process. These categories (A, B, and C) provide a starting point for
planners attempting to identify potential threat agents. Agents were categorized according
to a ranking system that examined public health impact in terms of mobility and
mortality, potential for production and dissemination, communicability, public
perception, and special preparations required. Category A agents were deemed to have
the greatest threat of employment and included Variola major (smallpox), Bacillus
anthracis (anthrax), Yersinia pestis (plague), Clostridium botulinum (botulism toxin),
Francisella tularensis (tularemia), Filoviridae (Ebola and Marburg), and Arenaviridae
(Lassa). Category B agents were the next level on the threat continuum. These agents
included Coxiella burnetii (Q fever), Brucella species (brucellosis), Burkholderia mallei
(glanders), Burkholderia pseudomallei (melioidosis), alphaviruses (Venezuelan equine
encephalitis, eastern equine encephalitis, and western equine encephalitis), Rickettsia
prowazekii (louse-borne typhus fever), toxins (ricin and staphylococcal enterotoxin B),
Chlamydiapsittaci (psittacosis), Salmonella species, Escherichia coli 0157:H7, Vibrio
cholerae, and Cryptosporidium parvum. Finally, category C agents were identified as
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agents that present an emerging threat. Nipah virus and Hantavirus were listed as the
only two category C agents (Rotz et al., 2002).
The literature has also surprisingly identified various other agents not listed by the
seminal works of the CDC that could be employed in bioterrorism. These include
influenza (Cheh, 2006; USAMRIID, 2005; Vorobjev et al., 1997), Rickettsia typhi (fleaborne typhus fever) (Vorobjev et al., 1997), T-2 (trichothecene) mycotoxin (Fung, 2006;
USAMRIID, 2005), and severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) coronavirus
(Shepherd, Cunnion, & Shoff, 2006; USAMRIID, 2005).
Preparedness to Respond to a Bioterrorism Incident
Professional Mandate
The literature provided a clear professional mandate for nurses and physicians
working in the ED setting to provide care after a biological terrorism incident. For the
nurse with specialty certification in emergency nursing, the Canadian Nurses Association
(2006) states that an emergency nurse must be able to ensure safety of the environment
from toxic biological, chemical, or radiological contamination. This includes initiating
decontamination procedures, providing care for the patient with infectious diseases, and
initiating isolation precautions when warranted. Although the College of Nurses of
Ontario (2002) does not specifically address bioterrorism preparedness, their standards of
practice suggest that registered nurses are responsible for having the knowledge relevant
to their area of professional practice. The Emergency Nurses Association provides
emergency nursing certification in the USA. The core emergency nursing competencies
with respect to disaster planning and management are considerably clearer and better
stated than the Canadian competencies (Klein, 2000). Specifically, testable core
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competencies exist in the identification and management of patients, who have been
exposed to a biological, or toxin agent. Although it made no specific reference to
biological terrorism management, the Royal College of Physicians and Surgeons of
Canada (2003) recommends that all emergency medicine physicians be required to have
expertise in disaster management. Further, no reference in the literature could be found
for nursing students practicing in ED settings during a disaster.
DiMaggio, Markenson, Loo, and Redlener (2005) conducted a random survey that
examined willingness of 1,919 American paramedics to report to work after a variety of
disaster related events. Despite the clear professional mandate indicated by the study, the
authors concluded that only 64.8% of paramedics would be willing to report to a limited
(10 hospitals, 200 patients) smallpox outbreak. This was considerably lower than the
willingness to respond for events related to a major snow storm (84.1%), fire with 1,000
smoke inhalation casualties (87.5%), or an explosion with 2,000 casualties (87.7%).
Surprisingly, the willingness to respond was even higher (74.3%) for a chemical
terrorism event with 5,000 casualties, or a radiological terrorism event (73.8%) with 500
casualties than a biological terrorism event. Of the paramedics who indicated a
willingness to respond to any disaster situation, 83.3% cited a sense of responsibility as
their reason for doing so, while 69.9% indicated it was part of their professional code of
ethics. This work provides insight into a potential conflict between professional mandates
versus willingness to respond. Because these results are not generalizable to the Canadian
health care system, or to nurses and physicians working in ED settings in Canada, it is not
known if these groups of health care professionals would respond similarly.
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Bioterrorism Incident Preparedness
Chen, Hickner, Fink, Galliher, and Burstin (2002) found that family physicians
who felt prepared for a natural disaster were four times more likely than other doctors to
know how to respond to a biological terrorism attack (35% versus 9%, p < .001).
Although this is an interesting finding, the authors did not explore the factors that lead
physicians to consider themselves prepared for a disaster. The literature is not clear with
respect to what constitutes preparedness of ED or which competencies lead to a state of
preparedness. The lack of clear direction for ED preparedness is likely due to the fact that
the topic is interdisciplinary in nature (for instance, clinicians, policy makers, engineers,
public affairs), and complex with respect to the myriad of possible disaster types and the
impact that the disaster may have upon ED operations (Klein, 2000). It is suggested
however that for EDs to be prepared for NBC events clinicians must have an awareness
of the threat of an attack (Beaton, 2002; Chen et al., 2002; Kollek, 2003). It was also
found that knowledge attained through education is paramount to preparedness (Pavlin,
1999; Stanley & Veenema, 2007; United States Public Health Service [USPHS], 2004)
and that ED clinicians should have formal training in disaster preparedness and
management (Gebbie & Qureshi, 2002; Klein, 2000; Langan, 2005; Stanley & Veenema,
2007; Veenema, 2007a).
Biological Terrorism Awareness
The literature showed that having an awareness of how biological terrorism acts
may be employed against the population, what biological agents a terrorist could use, and
how probable the clinician feels an attack may be is fundamental to the concept of
preparedness for a bioterrorism incident (Ackerman & Moran, 2004; Beaton, 2002;
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Chang, 2006; Croddy & Ackerman, 2007; Kollek, 2003). Although the importance of
awareness has been identified for NBC disasters, and appears frequently in anecdotal
checklists for bioterrorism preparedness, it has not been scientifically studied in ED
settings with respect to biological terrorism. Only Beaton (2002) explored awareness by
utilizing a questionnaire that examined potential terrorist biological agents and the
perception of threat. This study was not limited to the awareness of biological terrorism
threat, but rather explored the entire range of NBC events. It also utilized an American
paramedic sample, which may not be generalizable to Canadian ED clinicians as the level
of training, possible threat awareness, and health care system structure is not congruent
between the two populations.
Education and Knowledge about Biological Terrorism
Understanding the adequacy of knowledge possessed by emergency clinicians is
of prime importance in preparing for a bioterrorism event (USPHS, 2004). The literature
was reviewed in an attempt to find studies that examined the relevant content and
knowledge of nurses and physicians. The literature identified three areas of knowledge as
important competencies for nurses and physicians to possess. These include the ability to
decontaminate and isolate patients, and the act of protecting oneself and thus allowing
safe care to the patient to be rendered. It is generally accepted that education and training
increases competence and knowledge in the ED (Bracken & Martinez, 2000). However,
no literature could be found that examined the factors affecting the knowledge that ED
clinicians possess with respect to health care after a bioterrorism event.
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Education
Three studies of interest with respect to education and bioterrorism were found.
One examined general training levels (Ghilarducci, Pirrallo, & Hegmann, 2000), another
examined school curricula (Markenson, DiMaggio, & Redlener, 2005), and the third
evaluated concrete knowledge with respect to physicians and biological terrorism (Chen
et al., 2002). Ghilarducci et al (2000) examined the training level of ED nursing staff,
physicians, and security and auxiliary personnel with respect to casualty management in
patients presenting from a hazardous materials incident. The researchers divided the
concept of training into two categories: awareness training (at least four hours) and
operations training (at least eight hours of training). Participants provided information
pertaining to total number of hours they had with respect to training about bioterrorism.
Participants were 5,654 nursing staff working in 119 level-one American trauma centers
and 1,806 physicians working in 117 level-one American trauma centers. The study
concluded that overall only 36% of the staff had received training, with physicians having
more awareness training than nursing staff (35.3% versus 23.4%, respectively). The
findings however suggested that the two groups had approximately the same levels of
operational level training (physicians 9% versus nursing staff 8.8%). When the readiness
of each the trauma centre (n - 156) was examined, only 16.7% (n = 26) centres had 10 or
more operationally trained staff in the ED. Only 28.8% of the participants acknowledged
having one or more hours of hazardous materials training per annum. These rates are
congruent with those reported by Chen et al. (2002) who found that only 18% of family
physicians had received any prior training in bioterrorism preparedness.
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Markenson et al. (2005) identified the need for education for health professionals
with respect to how to respond to a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or
explosive terrorist incident. The authors suggested that many of the necessary topics that
are relevant to such terrorist incidents are already part of existing curricula and are taught
as part of other subjects such as infectious disease, public health, or epidemiology.
Despite this observation, only one of the 25 American medical schools that were
examined had a requirement for formal training in bioterrorism. The authors pointed out
that many medical schools attempt to address this lack of content pertaining to
bioterrorism with continuing medical education courses. The authors criticized this
approach to education because continuing education courses are general and do not
address the clinical role in the ED. In fact, the authors concluded that there is a clear need
to incorporate terrorism preparedness training to the curricula of professional health
programs. They proposed core competencies for nursing, dental, and medical schools, as
well as schools of public health. Of particular interest was a core competency for nurses
to have level three (application) competency (of six levels [knowledge, comprehension,
application, analysis, synthesis, and evaluation] in the cognitive domain of Bloom's
Taxonomy) to assist them to identify and understand the epidemiology, route of
exposure, treatment, and infection control practices for agents that are classified by the
CDC as category A agents. Physicians were recommended to have only level two
competency (comprehension) for this same task standard. With respect to category B
bioterrorism agents, nurses were expected to have level one competency (knowledge),
while physicians were expected to have level two competency (comprehension).
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Although an attempt through this review of the literature was made to ascertain the
existence of bioterrorism education in nursing programs, no information could be found.
General Knowledge
Chen et al. (2002) conducted a random survey of 614 family physicians and found
95% believe a bioterrorist attack in the United States is a real threat. When asked to
indicate which biological agents they thought were most likely to be used in a biological
terrorist attack, they gave seven responses. Six of those conformed to the CDC's category
A agent list (anthrax [cited by 96 % of participants], smallpox [82%], plague [28%],
botulism [22%], Ebola [16%], and tularemia [11%]). Nerve gas was the seventh agent
(14%), which reflects confusion over the difference between biological and chemical
agents. It was reported that family physicians who have received bioterrorism training
were three times more likely than other physicians (55% versus 20%, p <.001) to report
that they knew how to respond to a bioterrorist attack. This was one of the few studies
found with respect to clinician threat perception. It surveyed only family medicine
physicians in the USA and therefore is not generalizable to other health care providers,
such as nurses, or to the Canadian health care system.
Knowledge about Decontamination
The purpose of decontamination by health care providers is not to lessen the
damage done to the patient, but to limit the spread of contamination and reduce the
potential reaerosolization of the biological agent (Burenzvige, 1992; Franz, 1997). It was
noted as a fundamental component of protection in the hospital setting (Macintyre et al,
2002; USAMRIID, 2005; USPHS, 2004) and care of casualties thought to have been
overtly exposed to biological agents. Most biological agents (except mycotoxins) are not
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dermally active and hence the risk of disease contraction through intact skin is
inconsequential. All decontamination must occur before the contaminated patient enters
the ED in order to prevent facility compromise through contamination. No studies could
be found in the literature that identified the actual knowledge possessed by ED clinicians
on the topic of decontamination.
Knowledge about Personal Protection
The literature provided numerous references suggesting that possession and
correct use of personal protective equipment (PPE) is paramount to reducing the risk of
spreading communicable diseases both to staff and other patients in the event of a
bioterrorism attack (Grow & Rubinson, 2003; Henderson et al, 1999; USPHS, 2004).
Markenson et al. (2005) suggested that both nurses and physicians should be able to
demonstrate proficiency in selecting and using PPE in a range of bioterrorism situations
typical to one's health profession. However, the authors did elaborate further with regard
to the specific knowledge required. Secor-Turner and O'Boyle (2006) conducted a
literature search of Ovid-Medline and PubMed with an aim of identifying works that
examine the psychological impact of disaster work, nurses, and bioterrorism. Their search
revealed reports suggesting that possessing and understanding the use of PPE is important
in reducing the psychological implications on heath care staff during and after a
biological terrorism attack. It was identified that a situation would "feel" less dangerous
if a person can have a sense of control and that PPE provides this sense of control to
some undetermined degree.
Given the variations in PPE requirements based on the biologic agent, there is a
risk for confusion among health professionals with regard to the selection and use of
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PPE. Despite the importance that health care professionals be knowledgeable about PPE
and how to use them, little is known about health care professionals' preparedness for a
bioterrorist attack as it relates to the use of PPE. In fact, no studies examining the actual
knowledge of clinicians in the ED with respect to selection and use of PPE could be
found.
Knowledge about Isolation
In addition to PPE, isolation of patients who have been exposed to contagious
biological agents is a key component of managing a biological terrorism event (Grow &
Rubinson, 2003; McKinney, Wesley, Sprang, & Troutman, 2005; USAMRIID, 2005;
USPHS, 2004). Depending on the biological agent of exposure (standard, contact,
airborne, or droplet), precautions must be maintained (Grow & Rubinson, 2003;
Henderson et al., 1999; Inglesby, Dennis et al, 2000; USAMRIID, 2005). The
importance of isolation as a manner of containing infection was underscored in the
literature with reports from the SARS outbreak. With respect to SARS, 77% of probable
SARS cases in Canada were the result of in-hospital exposure (Grow & Rubinson, 2003).
Similarly, the Director General of Health for Taiwan reported that 94% of SARS
infections in that country were transmitted inside hospitals (McNeil, 2003). Although not
a prototypical biological terrorism agent (but a potential agent), the SARS experience
serves as an excellent example of the importance of isolation for an emerging, airborne
infection. Only one author (Rubinson et al., 2005) noted the importance of ED staff
correctly utilizing isolation. No studies could be found with regard to knowledge of ED
clinicians with respect to appropriate isolation measures after a biological terrorism
incident.
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Biological Terrorism - Immediate References
Given the large amount of knowledge required by clinicians for the management
of biological terrorism incidents, it is important that they be aware of available resources.
McKinney et al. (2005) stated that detailed just-in-time resources for clinicians are of
critical importance to frontline workers. Ghilarducci et al. (2000) identified the need to
have ready reference materials (books) on the subject of chemical accidents or terrorism
in the ED for use by the staff at the time of a crisis. In the study by Ghilarducci et al.
(2000) of 156 level one-trauma centers in the United States, they found that 81.4% had at
least one chemical response reference available. No information was reported on the
accessibility of biological terrorism treatment references.
The aforementioned literature reveals that a substantial focus has been paid to the
actual security threat of bioterrorism and its biological agents. However, no studies were
found that examined knowledge, awareness, and perception levels of ED clinicians with
respect to management of a bioterrorist event. Given the importance that ED clinicians be
well versed in this content area, research is needed to determine the extent of their
knowledge levels. Such a study is likely to provide a much-needed assessment of ED
clinicians' knowledge, identify potential knowledge deficits, and make future curricular
recommendations to overcome these deficits.
Summary of the Literature Review
The literature identified the clear possibility and threat of a future biological
attack on the Canadian population. This was evident in terms of terrorist motivation for
use, as evidenced by past use or attempted use of biological agents by terrorists and the
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technical means of executing a biological terrorism attack. A substantial list of possible
biological agents for which terrorists might opt to use was discovered.
It is almost universally agreed upon that ED nurses and physicians have a
professional mandate to be prepared for all disasters, including a biological terrorism
attack. Gaps exist in the literature as to what is an acceptable level of preparedness or
what features constitute ED preparedness for a bioterrorism event. It was identified that
threat awareness and knowledge are fundamental to the concept of preparedness. Large
gaps exist in the literature with respect to how to evaluate threat awareness, or what
actual level of threat awareness ED clinicians have with respect to bioterrorism.
Knowledge was often related to education and training in the literature. No
bioterrorism knowledge evaluation tool, or the level of knowledge ED clinicians have
with respect to bioterrorism health care could be found. Although the topics of
decontamination, isolation procedures, and PPE were frequently identified as core
knowledge requirements for emergency clinicians, little is known about the current level
of knowledge that ED clinicians possess with respect to these content areas.
Public health workers, (Hamburg, 2001; Kerby, et al., 2005; Landesman, et al.,
2001) the prehospital emergency medical services population, (Beaton, 2002; DiMaggio,
et al., 2005) academic educators teaching health care clinicians, (Markenson, et al., 2005;
McKinney, et al., 2005) and family physicians (Chen et al, 2002) have been previously
studied with respect to biological terrorism preparedness. However, there is a dearth of
literature that examines ED clinician's awareness and knowledge for a bioterrorism
event, as most previous studies concentrated on a chemical, or a general hazardous
materials incident. Although important, knowledge, techniques, and preparation for
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managing a chemical terrorism event, or an industrial chemical accident are considerably
different than a biological terrorism incident.
In summary, the literature indicates there is a threat of biological terrorism, and
emergency clinicians should be able to manage patients resulting from such an incident.
Literature has been published on what emergency clinicians should know and the skills,
techniques, and procedures to manage a biological terrorism situation. The clear gap in
research, which emerged from this literature review, is the actual awareness and
knowledge that Canadian ED clinicians have with respect to biological terrorism.
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CHAPTER III
DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
Research Design
A cross-sectional descriptive survey was conducted to examine the factors
influencing the knowledge pertaining to the health management of victims of biological
terrorism amongst ED clinicians. The study compared the responses of ED registered
nurses, physicians, and senior nursing students at a single time interval.
Setting and Sample
Study participants were recruited from a faculty of nursing at a Canadian
university and two Canadian EDs located in the same city. Participants from the
university were fourth year baccalaureate nursing students, while participants from the
hospital sites were registered nurses and physicians. Both EDs receive approximately the
same volume of patients (approximately 55,000 visits per year). A convenience sampling
technique was utilized to recruit 130 participants from the three research sites. This
sample size was calculated according to Tabachnick and Fidell's (2001) formula (7V> 50
+ 8m, where m is the number of independent variables). Thus, with an estimated number
of 10 independent variables, the sample should consist of 130 participants. This sample
size is within the limits of Stevens' (2002) rule of thumb that suggests 10 to 15
participants for each independent variable. Given that only nine variables were included
in the regression analysis, the sample of 130 participants was more than sufficient.
Inclusion Criteria
Eligible participants met the following inclusion criteria:
1. Be a registered nurse or physician who works full or part time in the ED; or
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2. Be a fourth year nursing student who is enrolled in a Bachelor of Science in Nursing
program.
Variable Definitions
Conceptual Definitions
Biological terrorism
A concrete definition of terrorism or biological terrorism is not universally
accepted by governments, scholars, or lawyers (Golder & Williams, 2004; Record, 2003).
However, terrorism has been conceptually defined as the unofficial (not sanctioned by a
legitimate government) use of violence and intimidation as a means to achieve political
aims (Soanes & Stevenson, 2005). Thus, biological terrorism, or more colloquially,
bioterrorism is the use of an infectious agent, harmful biological, or biochemical agent in
order to cause violence or intimidation as a means of achieving a political aim (Soanes &
Stevenson, 2005).
Knowledge
It has been proposed that knowledge is any piece of information that is justified,
believed to be true, and simply results due to sense perception (Plato, n.d./1986).
Conceptually, it is best defined as information and skills attained through education,
experience, theoretical, and/or practical understandings of a given subject. It is also
defined as the sum of what is known on a topic (Soanes & Stevenson, 2005). For the
purpose of this study, knowledge of bioterrorism was defined as the sum of information
that a clinician understands on the topic of health care management of bioterrorism
victims including isolation, decontamination, and personal protection.
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Awareness of threat
There is no definite conceptual definition of the concept "awareness of threat."
However, given that the legal meaning of a threat is defined as something that could
cause bodily harm and thus limit personal or societal freedom of action (Soanes &
Stevenson, 2005), awareness of threat could be defined as the perception of an individual
or a society of the likelihood that a potentially harmful threat is real.
Operational Definitions and Instrumentation
No instrument that operationalizes preparedness as measured through awareness
of threat and knowledge pertaining to biological terrorism among ED clinicians could be
found in the literature. Thus, the Bioterrorism Assessment Tool (BAT) was specifically
developed for the purpose of this study to provide a measurement tool of these two
concepts. The BAT is composed of three sections that solicits information about the
demographic characteristics of participants, their awareness of threat, and their
knowledge with respect to the health management of biological terrorism victims (see the
Appendix).
The demographics section of the BAT identifies the participants' profession,
highest level of schooling, age, gender, certification, if the participant has worked in an
American ED in the past five years, and years of professional and ED experience. The
demographic section also contains three questions that solicit information pertaining to
the amount, nature of training received in the area of health management of biological
terrorism, and the clinician access to just-in-time information on the topic of bioterrorism
while working in the ED.
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The awareness of threat section contains six questions that explore the clinicians'
awareness of the threat of bioterrorism. The first two questions of this section use a
Likert-type scale to explore the feeling the clinician has with respect to the probability of
a biological terrorism attack occurring somewhere in Canada, or in their city over the
period of the next 10 years. This is followed by two additional Likert-type questions that
explore participants' perceptions of the level of preparedness they and their ED have to
respond to a biological terrorism incident. The remaining two questions of this section
examine the awareness/recollection that participants may have about biological terrorism
threats or attacks that have occurred in the past 35 years and the awareness of the
biological agents that may be used in bioterrorist attacks. These last two questions
provide participants with a list of 10 options, from which only five are correct. Each
response was awarded one point for each correct answer or one negative point for each
incorrect answer. Thus, the scores on these two questions may range from negative five
(the lowest possible score) to positive five (the highest possible score). The awareness
scale was not treated as a psychometric scale. Instead, each of the six items on this
section was treated as unique units of analysis (that is, a single item measure).
The third section of the BAT provides a psychometric tool to measure the
knowledge of the participants with regard to biological terrorism. It focuses more
specifically on knowledge related to areas of decontamination, isolation, and personal
protection that clinicians are anticipated to possess with respect to the health management
of a biological terrorism event. Knowledge pertaining to these areas is assessed through
the use of four scenarios that present different possible biological terrorism events (mail
attack, protest attack, explosive attack, and clandestine discovery), each with a different
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biological agent, (Ebola, ricin, or unknown agents) and different methods of presentation
to the ED (surprise arrival with no decontamination, decontaminated at the scene, mass
casualty event with contaminated, seriously injured patients, and presentation after a low
probability of exposure, sometime after the event, with self decontamination). At the end
of each scenario, a question examines the patient decontamination requirements, isolation
requirements, and the staff personal protection requirements that are appropriate for the
situation. The situations were scored with one point for a correct answer and negative one
point for an incorrect answer. The highest possible score on knowledge is 12 and the
lowest possible score is - 12. Given that the questionnaire has not been validated in
previous research, it was explored for psychometric properties through testing of its
validity and reliability.
Content validity of the BAT was established through the use of a content validity
index (CVI) as discussed by Burns and Grove (2005). The BAT was sent to four experts
in emergency medicine, infectious diseases, and/or the medical aspects of biological
defence. These experts all possessed an undergraduate degree in medicine and were
employed by the Ministry of National Defence. All four experts had significant training
in the medical aspects of biological agent defence and three of the four possessed
graduate level schooling in the form of a Doctor of Philosophy (two) or a Master of
Health Science degree (one). The one expert without postgraduate schooling is currently
working full-time in the field of bioterrorism preparedness and has graduated from the
Medical Management of Biological Casualties course that is offered by the United States
Army Research Institute for Infectious Diseases. The BAT was sent to the experts for
evaluation during the first week of August 2007. Respondents were asked to rate the

39

validity (on a four-point scale) of each item to the concept of interest (Lynn, 1986). Space
was left for open comments to be entered if the respondent wished to do so. Results from
all four respondents were grouped into two categories; the item is either irrelevant to the
concept or relevant to the concept. Of the 18-items, the CVI was calculated to be 1.00,
indicating a 100% agreement among all experts that all items were relevant to the concept
being measured. No comments reflecting concerns regarding any item were recorded and
the BAT was not modified prior to data collection.
Following the completion of data collection, reliability and construct validity of
the awareness part and the knowledge part of the BAT was examined using Cronbach's
alpha and exploratory factor analysis (principal component analysis) techniques. The
awareness of the threat part of the BAT consisted of four items yielding a Cronbach's
alpha of .619. Factor analysis of these items produced a multidimensional scale with two
distinct factors using a varimax rotation with Kaiser normalization (thus preventing the
covariance of factors) (Table 1). The first factor identified was external awareness with a
Cronbach's alpha of .871. This included the items "Probability of an Attack in Canada in
the next 10 Years" and "Probability of an Attack in their City in the next 10 Years." The
second factor identified was internal awareness with a Cronbach's alpha of .687. This
factor was composed of the items "Personal Preparedness for Bioterrorism" and "ED
Preparedness for Bioterrorism."
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Table 1 Factor Loadings of the Awareness Scale
Variable

Not Rotated
Factor 1
Factor 2

Rotated
Factor 1
Factor 2

PACA10A

.850

-.408

.940

.061

PACI10A

.845

-.407

.936

.059

PPBT

.551

.676

.149

.860

EDPBT

.405

.785

-.032

.882

PACA10A = Probability of an attack on Canada in the next 10 years.
PACI10A = Probability of an attack of their city in the next 10 years.
PPBT = Personal preparedness for bioterrorism.
EDPBT = ED preparedness for bioterrorism.
The internal consistency reliability of the original 12-item knowledge part of the
BAT was poor, as indicated by a Cronbach's alpha of .353. Using squared multiple
correlations, item correlations, and item deletion; poor items were successively deleted
from the instrument. The process of item deletion was halted when it was apparent that
further deletion would not improve Cronbach's alpha. As a result eight items remained,
on which factor analysis (principal component analysis) was performed using varimax
rotation with Kaiser normalization to examine the validity of the remaining set of items.
The remaining eight items included all of the questions from scenario two and four as
well as question on isolation and PPE from scenario number three. The analysis revealed
that although items could load to form a multidimensional scale (three dimensions), the
item loadings were not theoretically meaningful. Thus, all eight items were allowed to
load on one factor that accounted for 58.91% of the cumulative variance in knowledge. A
final Cronbach's alpha of .639 was achieved for the final 8-item knowledge scale. This
acceptable but modest value warrants further investigation of the knowledge scale.
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Protection of Human Subjects
This research conformed to the Government of Canada Tri-Council policy on the
ethical conduct of research involving humans (Interagency Secretariat on Research
Ethics, 2005). Approval was requested and granted from the research ethics boards of the
University of Windsor and two hospital sites where data collection occurred. Participants
were invited to provide a free and informed consent in written form prior to the
commencement of data collection. Participants were informed that their decision on
whether or not to participate in the study would not affect their student/employment
status, or any business that they may have or intend to have with the University of
Windsor. All individuals who met the inclusion criteria were invited to participate. To
ensure that all responses were anonymous no participants' identifying information was
placed on the survey. In order to protect the privacy of responses, participants were
advised to insert their completed surveys into a sealed envelope before dropping them
into the data collection box. The investigator was the sole person responsible for
collecting all completed surveys from the data collection box. Completed surveys were
secured in a locked container to which access was limited to the investigator. Data entry
into a computerized database was performed by the investigator who stored all data in a
password-protected computer. No respondent identifiers were used in the computerized
database. All data will be destroyed after five years of the study completion (American
Psychological Association, 2001). Although the Ministry of National Defence, as part of
the Canadian Forces Post Graduate Training Plan is funding this study, no conflict of
interest exists for the researcher.
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Data Collection
Data collection commenced on September 3, 2007 upon ethics clearance from the
various research ethics boards and was completed on October 17, 2007. The investigator
visited the recruitment sites (the two EDs and the fourth year nursing classes) and
explained the study to potential participants. In addition to the verbal and written
explanations that were provided to those present during the investigator's visits, written
descriptions of the study and the role of participants were left (for example in the mailbox
of staff) for those who were not present during these visits. A follow up visit was made
on a weekly basis to ensure all staff members were aware of the research project and had
surveys at their disposal for completion. Upon their consent to participate in the study,
the investigator provided the participants with the questionnaire and provided them with
verbal instructions concerning the completion of the survey. In order to ensure the quality
of data collection and avoid confusion, the investigator provided participants with the
opportunity to ask questions or provide comments pertaining to the survey after the
completion of the verbal explanation. Participants were given a choice to complete the
survey on site or take it away and complete at the time and location of their convenience.
Participants were instructed to drop the completed surveys in a secure data collection box
that was available at each of the sites, or to return the survey to the investigator with the
attached preaddressed stamped envelope. The completion time for the survey was
approximately 20 minutes.
The return rate was relatively high with a total of 165 (86%) returned surveys.
This included 100% of students (n = 73), 80.6% of nurses (n = 75), and 77.3% of
physicians (n = 17). With a fixed population of fourth year students and registered nurses
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working in the EDs, the population captured by the survey could be calculated for these
two groups. This survey captured 34.1% of the students and 61.5% of the registered
nurses in the geographical area of interest. The physicians' recruitment rate could not be
calculated because the number of physicians, working on locum or as residents in the
EDs, was unknown during the data collection period.
Data Analysis
SPSS 15.0 for Windows statistical software package was used to analyze the data.
Data analysis procedures included data screening, basic descriptive statistics, univariate
analysis (analysis of variance and Pearson's correlations), and multiple linear regression
analysis. After completion of all data entry, 30 completed surveys were randomly
selected and reviewed for the accuracy of the data input into the SPSS database. No
errors were found. The database was also examined for out-of-range values and outliers
due to possible errors in data entry. Once again, no such errors were found.
Data Screening
Data screening involved searching for and managing any missing values, outliers, and
multicollinear variables. A check for violations of the statistical assumptions of normality
was performed amongst the continuous variables (El-Masri & Fox-Wasylyshyn, 2005;
Munro, 2005).
Upon examination of the database for missing data, there were 14 variables with
missing data (Table 2). Several authors suggest that when the amount of missing data are
small (less than 10%), the variable should be retained for analysis as deletion techniques
can introduce bias and/or result in larger standard errors due to the overall decrease in
sample size (Cohen & Cohen, 1983; El-Masri & Fox-Wasylyshyn, 2005; Patrician,
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2002). Other authors have suggested that variables with 40% or more missing data should
be deleted (Raymond & Roberts, 1987). Therefore, given that the greatest amount of
missing data in this study was 11.5% (for the age variable), all data were retained for
analysis.
Table 2
Summary of Item Missingness
Variable

Valid

Missing

% Missing

Gender

163

2

1.2%

Age

148

17

11.5%

Level of Schooling

163

2

1.2%

Years in Profession

90

2

2.2%

Years in Emergency

90

2

2.2%

Working in USA

90

1

1.1%

Personal Preparedness

164

1

0.6%

ED Preparedness

162

3

1.8%

Scenario #1 -Decontamination

164

1

0.6%

Scenario #1 -Isolation

163

2

1.2%

Scenario #1 - P P E

164

1

0.6%

Scenario #2 - Decontamination

164

1

0.6%

Scenario #3 - Decontamination

164

1

0.6%

Scenario #3 - Isolation

164

1

0.6%
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When the amount of data missing is small, and random in pattern it is feasible to use
almost any technique for handling missing data (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). Group
mean substitution was used to process the missing data. This technique is based on the
concept of within-group homogeneity and is thought to provide a more accurate estimate
of the actual data value than sample mean substitution due to the fact it minimizes the
risk of attenuation of the between-group variances that occurs the sample is examined as
a whole (Acock, 1997; El-Masri & Fox-Wasylyshyn, 2005; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).
Univariate normality was assessed by examining the distribution of the continuous
variables for outliers, skewness, and kurtosis (Munro, 2005; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).
Outliers were examined through the use of variable box plots and z scores. A z score
value of more than ± 3.29 was considered an outlier (Field, 2005). Outliers were initially
found in six of the continuous variables (Table 3). With very few outliers per variable,
outlier values were Winsorized by assigning them the next closest value (Cohen, 1996).
Table 3
Outliers
Variable

n

# of outliers

Yrs in ED

92

1

1.1%

28

Total # hours trg (training)

165

2

1.2%

24

# Hours trg in past 2 yrs

165

3

1.8%

16

History score

165

2

1.2%

-2&3

Agent score

165

1

0.6%

-3

Knowledge score

165

1

0.6%

6
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% outliers Value assigned

Skewness and kurtosis were explored using a ratio technique by dividing the reported
skewness and kurtosis statistics by the their respective SEs. Some authors (Pert, 1997;
Stevens, 2002) suggest that the value to determine a departure from normality is ± 1.96,
while others suggest it is acceptable to use a cut off value between ±2.58 and ± 3.29
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001). It as also been suggested in the statistics literature that one
not need examine the ratio between the given skewness or kurtosis value and the SE, but
rather look at the overall skewness and kurtosis value to determine a departure from
normality. Kline (1998) states that the marker for departure from normality would be an
absolute skewness value greater than 3 and/or an absolute kurtosis value greater than 10.
Upon initial examination, only the variables of years in profession, history score, and
agent awareness score exhibited normality (Table 4). Normality could not be achieved
(using the cut off of ± 3.29) in the total number of training hours, number of training
hours in the past two years, and knowledge score variables despite an attempt to
transform the data using base 10 logarithm, natural logarithm, or square roots. However it
was possible to find normality in the age and years working in ED variables though the
use of a square root transformation (Table 5). If the Kline (1998) criteria is used all of the
variables would be considered to be normally distributed as none of the skewness
statistics are over three and none of the kurtosis statistics are over 10.
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Table 4
Initial Evaluation for Normality
Variable

Skewness
Statistic SE Ratio

Kurtosis
Statistic SE Ratio

Age

.667

.189

3.53

-.606 .3 76 -

Yrs in profession

.583

.251

2.32

-.522 .498

-1.05

Yrs in ED

1.191 .251

4.75

1.412 .498

-

Total # hours trg (training)

2.348 .189 12.61

6.511 .376

-

# Hours trg in past 2 yrs

2.352 .189

12.44

5.919 .376

-

History score

-.398 .189

-2.11

.437

.376

1.16

Agent score

-.083 .189

-.44

.649

.376

1.73

Knowledge score

1.112 .189

5.88

1.198 .376

-

Table 5
Normality after Square Root Transformation
Variable

Skewness
Statistic SE Ratio

Kurtosis
Statistic SE Ratio

Age

.494

.189

2.61

•1.008 .376

-2.68

Yrs in ED

.119

.251

.47

.559 .498

-1.12

Basic Descriptive and Univariate Statistics
Basic descriptive statistics including general frequencies of the categorical variables,
as well as the Mand SD of continuous variables were performed and are reported in
chapter four. Analysis of variance (ANOVA) comparisons were performed on
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independent categorical variables to identify how the knowledge score differs across
categories o those variables. Pearson's correlations were performed to examine the
relationship between the continuous independent variables (for example, age) and
knowledge score.
Multiple Linear Regression Analysis
Prior to regression analysis, variables with more than two categories were dummy
coded in order to include them in the regression model (Field, 2005; Tabachnick &
Fidell, 2001). Independent variables that have ap value of < .25 in the univariate analysis
were included in the regression analysis. The selection of a liberal p value of < .25 was
used to avoid the unnecessary deletion of potentially significant independent variables
from the final multivariate model (Hosmer & Lemshow, 2000). The regression
model examined the predictors of knowledge pertaining to the health management of a
bioterrorism attack. An alpha of .05 was used as the criterion to determine a significant
finding in the multivariate analysis.
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CHAPTER VI
FINDINGS
Sample Characteristics
Demographic Data
Tables 6 and 7 display the demographic characteristics of the study participants.
The results suggest that only 2.7% (n = 2) of registered nurses had advanced certification
in emergency nursing. Of the physicians, 58.8% (n = 10) had certification in emergency
medicine and 11.8% (n = 2) had certification in family practice from the Canadian
College of Family Physicians. No participants had certification in infection control or a
board specialty from either of the royal colleges.
Table 6
Sample Characteristics of Categorical Variables
Total Sample

Students

Nurses

Physicians

Female

81.8%

93.2%

86.7%

11.8%

Male

18.2%

6.8%

13.3%

88.2%

High School 37.0%

83.6%

0.0%

0.0%

College

33.9%

12.3%

62.7%

0.0%

University

29.1%

4.1%

37.7%

100.0%

Gender

Schooling

American ED Work
Yes

27.2%

N/A

30.7%

11.8%

No

72.8%

N/A

69.3%

88.2%
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Table 7
Sample Characteristics of Continuous Variables
Total Sample
M
SD

Students
M
SD

Nurses
M
SD

Physicians
M
SD

Age

31.4

10.6

22.5

37.2

7.8

44.3

8.6

Years in Prof

13.2

8.8

12.3

8.4

17.1

9.7

Years in ED

8.6

6.8

7.4

5.9

14.2

8.8

Total BT Hours

4.2

6.6

1.5

3.8

5.5

7.1

11.2

12.9

BT Hrs last 2 Years

2.4

4.5

1.3

3.6

3.6

5.1

3.1

4.5

2.6

Information Access
Most participants reported receiving their training in bioterrorism from within the
hospital setting (32.7%; n = 54), a university or college course (10.9%; n - 18), or from
reading journals or books (10.9%; n = 18). Participants indicated that in the event of a
crisis they would seek information from the hospital policy and procedures manual
(66.7%; n = 110), from the ED manager (51.5%; n = 85), or from the Internet (43.6%; n =
72). Only 16.4% {n = 12) of students indicated that they received bioterrorism emergency
training through university or college courses, while 50.7% (n = 38) of registered nurses
indicated that they received their bioterrorism emergency management training from
within the hospital. Nursing students indicated that in the event of a crisis, they would
look for information in the hospital policy manual (68.5%; n = 50), from the ED manager
(53.5%; n = 39), or on the Internet (52.1%; n = 38). Similarly, registered nurses reported
that in the event of a crisis they would seek information from hospital policy manual
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(66.7%; n = 50), from the ED manager (58.7%; n = 44), or from the ED educator (41.3%;
n = 31). The results suggest that physicians were most likely to have received
bioterrorism training through a university or college course (29.4%; n = 5), hospital
setting (29.4%; n = 5), or by attending a conference (29.4%; n = 5). Physicians indicated
that in the event of a crisis, they would primarily contact the Medical Officer of Health
for information (76.5%; n = 13), search the Internet (70.6%; n = 12), look it up a textbook
(64.7%; n = 11), or ask a trusted colleague (64.7%; n = 11).
Awareness of the Threat of Bioterrorism
Tables 8, 9, and 10 display the self report data pertaining to the awareness of
participants of the probability and preparedness for a bioterrorist act, the awareness of
past bioterrorism events, and the awareness of potential biological agents that may be
used in terrorist acts. The results suggest that physicians did the best, followed by nurses,
and nursing students.
Table 8
Awareness Probability and Preparedness
Total Sample

Students

Nurses

Physicians

Probability of an Attack in Canada within the next 10 years
Not happen

1.2%

0.0%

2.7%

0.0%

Low

33.3%

39.7%

25.3%

41.2%

Moderate

46.1%

47.9%

48.0%

29.4%

High

15.2%

9.6%

18.7%

23.5%

Will Happen

4.2%

2.7%

5.4%

5.9%
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Probability of an Attack in their City within the next 10 years
Not happen

3.0%

2.7%

4.0%

58.8%

Low

40.6%

42.5%

34.7%

23.5%

Moderate

38.8%

41.1%

40.0%

11.8%

High

15.2%

13.7%

17.3%

5.9%

Will Happen

2.4%

0.0%

4.0%

0.0%

Personal Preparedness for a Bioterrorism Attack
Not Prepared 41.6%

46.6%

42.7%

17.6%

Low

42.4%

46.6%

41.3%

29.4%

Moderate

15.2%

6.8%

14.3%

52.9%

High

0.6%

0.0%

1.3%

0.0%

Fully Prepared 0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

Not Prepared 15.8%

11.0%

21.3%

11.8%

Low

37.6%

39.7%

36.0%

35.3%

Moderate

44.2%

49.3%

40.0%

41.2%

1.8%

0.0%

2.7%

5.9%

Fully Prepared 0.6%

0.0%

0.0%

5.9%

ED Preparedness for a Bioterrorism Attack

High
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Table 9
Historical Awareness
Total Sample

Students

Nurses

Physicians

Oregon Restaurant Attack
Yes

3.0%

1.4%

2.7%

11.8%

No

97.0%

98.6%

97.3%

88.2%o

Yes

6.1%

4.1%

6.7%

11.8%

No

93.9%

95.9%

93.3%

88.2%

Yes

18.8%

2.7%

21.3%

76.5%

No

81.2%

97.3%

78.7%

23.5%

Yes

73.3%

65.8%

78.7%

82.4%

No

26.7%

34.2%

21.3%

17.6%

Chicago Water Scare

Japanese Cult Attacks

Hotel-Dieu Scare

US Postal Anthrax Attack

M±SD

Yes

77.0%

71.2%

84.0%

70.6%

No

23.0%

28.8%

16.0%

29.4%

1.1 ±1.2

0.6 ±1.0

1.4 ±1.2

2.1 ±1.0
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Table 10
Biological Agent Awareness
Total Sample

Students

Nurses

Physicians

Yes

53.9%

52.1%

50.7%

76.5%

No

46.1%

47.9%

49.3%

23.5%

Yes

9.1%

11.0%

4.0%

23.5%

No

90.3%

89.0%

96.0%

76.5%

Yes

49.1%

50.7%

48.0%

47.1%

No

50.9%

49.3%

52.0%

52.9%

Yes

53.3%

56.2%

45.3%

76.5%

No

46.7%

43.8%

54.7%

23.5%

Yes

13.3%

12.3%

12.0%

23.5%

No

86.7%

87.7%

88.0%

76.5%

0.9 ±1.4

0.6 ±1.5

1.0±1.3

1.9 ±1.6

Smallpox

Fever

Plague

Botulism Toxin

Tularaemia

M±SD
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Knowledge
The knowledge score of the entire 12-item questionnaire suggests that physicians
had the highest level of knowledge (M= -2.0, SD ± 4.6), followed by registered nurses
(M= -3.0, SD ±3.3), and students (M= -3.9, SD ± 2.7). The overall knowledge score for
the entire sample was poor (M= -3.3, SD ± 3.2). Descriptive frequencies on data
pertaining to responses to items on the knowledge scale are provided in Table 11 with the
correct answer bolded. The Appendix provides explanation of the four knowledge
scenarios. On the surface the results suggest (without further statistical analysis) that
physicians have the greatest amount of knowledge with respect to patient isolation and
personal protection, while nurses have the greatest amount of knowledge with respect to
decontamination.
Table 11
Descriptive Frequencies in the Knowledge Scale

Students

Total Sample

Nurses

Physicians

Scenario Number One
Decontamination
None

1.2%

1.4%

0.0%

5.9%

Clothes off

4.8%

8.2%

1.3%

5.9%

Shower

3.6%

2.7%

4.0%

5.9%

Full

90.4%

87.7%

94.7%

82.4%
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Disposition
Resuscitation

1.8%

1.4%

2.7%

0.0%

Waiting Room

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

0.0%

Isolation

89.1%

95.9%

84.0%

82.4%

2.7%

13.3%

17.6%

Other

9.1%

PPE
Standard

9.1%

5.5%

13.3%

5.9%

Airborne

29.1%

30.1%

25.3%

41.2%

Droplet

1.2%

1.4%

1.3%

0.0%

Contact

2.4%

2.7%

1.3%

5.9%

Special

58.2%

60.3%

58.7%

47.1%

Scenario Number Two
Decontamination
None

16.4%

11.0%

20.0%

23.5%

Clothes off

9.1%

15.1%

2.7%

11.8%

Shower

7.3%

11.0%

2.7%

11.8%

67.3%

63.0%

74.7%

52.9%

Resuscitation

3.6%

2.7%

5.3%

0.0%

Outside

20.0%

12.3%

25.3%

29.4%

Isolation

64.2%

79.9%

54.7%

41.2%

Other

12.1%

5.5%

14.7%

29.4%

Full
Disposition
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PPE
Standard

14.5%

11.0%

17.3%

17.6%

Airborne

23.6%

23.3%

24.0%

23.5%

Droplet

4.2%

4.1%

4.0%

5.9%

Contact

11.5%

15.1%

6.7%

17.6%

Special

46.1%

46.6%

48.0%

35.3%

Scenario Number Three
Decontamination
None-1

5.5%

9.6%

1.3%

5.9%

None-2

1.2%

2.7%

0.0%

0.0%

Some

17.6%

17.8%

13.3%

35.3%

Full

75.8%

69.9%

85.3%

58.8%

35.2%

24.7%

40.0%

58.8%

Outside

1.8%

4.1%

0.0%

0.0%

Isolation

17.6%

20.5%

17.3%

5.9%

Quarantied

45.5%

50.7%

42.7%

35.3%

Standard

16.4%

17.8%

16.0%

11.8%

Airborne

17.0%

12.3%

18.7%

29.4%

Droplet

1.8%

2.7%

1.3%

0.0%

Contact

6.7%

6.8%

6.7%

5.9%

Special

58.2%

60.3%

57.3%

52.9%

Disposition
Resuscitation

PPF
ST IT Hi

58

Scenario Number Four
Decontamination
None

26.3%

27.4%

17.3%

35.3%

Clothes off

9.1%

11.0%

6.7%

11.8%

Shower

9.1%

5.5%

8.0%

29.4%

Full

58.2%

56.2%

68.0%

23.5%

Resuscitation

7.3%

5.5%

6.7%

17.6%

Outside

5.5%

4.1%

8.0%

0.0%

Isolation

70.3%

78.1%

65.3%

58.5%

Other

17.0%

12.3%

20.0%

23.5%

Standard

18.8%

17.8%

18.7%

23.5%

Airborne

35.2%

32.9%

34.7%

47.1%

Droplet

1.8%

2.7%

1.3%

0.0%

Contact

7.9%

11.0%

6.7%

0.0%

Special

36.4%

35.6%

38.7%

29.4%

isposition

PPE

Univariate Analysis
Analysis of Variance (ANOVA)
One-way ANOVA tests were completed between the knowledge variable and the
variables of profession, highest level of schooling completed, gender, certification, and if
the participant had worked in America in the past five years (Table 12). The knowledge
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variable used for this analysis was a square root transformation of the raw knowledge
score to correct for its severe skewness. Table 12 suggests that there was no mean
difference in the groups across any of the variables.
Table 12
ANOVA of Knowledge
Variable

M±SD

F

Profession
MD

1.26 ±.83

RN / RN(EC)

1.04 ±.75

Student

.85 ± .74

Education Level
High school

.85 ±.74

College

.97 ± .74

University

1.15 ±.80

Certification
None

.95 ± .75

CCFP(EM)

1.19±.99

CCFP

1.00 ±.00

ENC(C) / CEN

.87 ±1.22

Gender
Female

.95 ± .76

Male

1.14 ±.75

60

~p

Z46

X)88

2.17

.118

.288

.834

1.56

.214

Worked in USA

3.13

Yes

1.17 ±.77

No

.85 ± .73

.080

F = the omnibus F statistic for the one-way ANOVA
Mean square root of knowledge = .98 ± .76
Pearson's Correlations
Two-tailed Pearson's product-moment correlations were completed between the
square root of the knowledge score and the variables external awareness, internal
awareness, number of years working in the ED, age, agent score, history score, and the
number of bioterrorism training hours in the past two years. Table 13 displays the results
of these correlations and suggests that only external awareness (r = .034; p = .662), years
of experience in the ED (r = .149;/? = .156), and age (r = .144;/? = .065) were not
associated with the knowledge score.
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Table 13
Pearson's Correlations: Continuous Variables and Knowledge
Variable

M±SD

r~

External Awareness

3.61 ±.76

.034

.662

Internal Awareness

2.08 ±1.58

.168

.031

Years in ED

2.67 ±1.20

.149

.156

Age

5.53 ±.89

.144

.065

Agent Score

.90 ±1.41

.159

.041

History Score

1.10±1.16

.197

.011

Number of hrs trg in past 2 yrs

2.42 ±±4.15
4.15

.188

.015

r = Pearson's product-moment correlation
Mean Square root of knowledge = .98 ± .76

Multivariate Analysis
Exploring the multivariate assumptions
A histogram and a probability plot were created using the square root of the
knowledge score as the dependent variable and all other variables as independent
variables into the linear regression model of SPSS. The histogram was examined for the
frequencies of the regression-standardized residual falling into a normal distribution
curve (Figure 2). It showed an approximate normal distribution, with no visible
skewness, leptokurtic, or platykurtic properties, indicating no issues with multivariate
normality (Corty, 2007). A probability plot was created for the linear fit of plotted
observed versus expected cumulative probabilities (Figure 3). It showed that the majority

62

of scores fall onto or near the normal distribution line, indicating that multivariate
linearity is assumed (Field, 2005).

Dependent Variable: Square Root of Knowlege
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Figure 2. Multivariate Normality
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Dependent Variable: Square Root of Knowledge
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Figure 3. Multivariate Linearity
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1.0

Both Mahalanobis and Cook's distances were performed to explore multivariate
outliers. Mahalanobis distance "measures how much the case's values of the independent
variables differ from the average of all cases. Therefore, a large Mahalanobis distance
identifies a case as having extreme values on one or more of the independent variables"
(SPSS, 2005, p.433). The largest Mahalanobis score found was 6.75. Given that the
critical value of a chi square distribution using 11 degrees of freedom (the number of
independent variables) and ap value of .001 was 31.6, the calculated Mahalanobis
distance was not significant, indicating the presence of no multivariate outliers. Cook's
distance is a measure of the overall influence of all cases on the model. Values of greater
than one may be a cause for concern (Cook & Weisberg, 1982). Although not required
due to the nonsignificance of the Mahalanobis distance, examination of the Cook's
distance revealed no presence of any influential data points (none had a Cook's distance
of s 1.0).
Multicollinearity is an undesirable situation that occurs within multiple
regressions where one or more predictor variables are highly correlated with the other
predictor variables (Cohen, 1996). Schroeder (1990) suggests a greater than .85 bivariate
correlation between independent variables creates a situation of multicollinearity.
Tabachnick and Fidel (2001) provide for a higher bivariate correlation of .90 before
multicollinearity presents as a statistical problem. Collinearity diagnostic statistics such
as tolerance, variance inflation factor (VIF), and condition index were examined. VIF
indicates the strength and the relationship of the independent variables (Field, 2005).
Myers (1990) and Schroeder (1990) both suggest a VIF of 10 is indicative of
multicollinearity. The data revealed that the highest VIF was 1.068, indicating no
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multicollinearity was present. Tolerance is the reciprocal of VIF (1/VIF). Field (2005)
has indicated values below .1 indicate serious problems, whereas Menard (1995) suggests
values below .2 may be of concern. The lowest tolerance value was .889, further
indicating the absence of multicollinearity. Condition index values greater than 10 are
suggestive of weak dependencies that may start to affect the regression estimates,
whereas a value of over 100 indicates a serious predicament with respect to
multicollinearity and the presence of numerical error (Belsley, Kuh, & Welsch, 1980).
Collinearity diagnostics revealed that the highest condition index was 3.252 and this
provided another indication of the absence of multicollinearity.
In addition to multicollinearity testing, Pearson's moment correlation test was
performed between pairs of continuous variables to examine the possibility of bivariate
collinearity. The results of these correlations (Table 13) showed no collinearity as
evidenced by bivariate correlations that were all below 0.8. However, given that "the total
number of bioterrorism training hours" and "bioterrorism training hours in the past two
years" have a singular relationship (in that, training hours in the last two years is included
in the total training hours), the variable "bioterrorism training in the last two years" was
excluded from the model.
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Table 14
Pearson's Correlations: Continuous Variables for Bivariate Collinearity
Variable

I

2

3

4

5

Internal awareness

1

External awareness

.13

1

Age (sqrt)

.09

.13

1

ED experience

.04

.11

7*

1

BT training hours

.4*

.14

.34*

.17

1

BT training hrs - past 2 years

.3*

.06

.14

.02

.72*

1

History score

.03

-.09

.39*

.2

.22*

.]

Agent score

.05

-.04

.20*

.16

.15

.(

(*) Indicates ap value < .05; BT = bioterrorism; ED = Emergency department
Linear regression analysis
Prior to performing the linear regression analysis, categorical variables with more
than three categories (profession and highest level of schooling) were dummy coded.
Forward stepwise approach was conducted using ap value of .05 as the inclusion criteria
and .15 as the removal criteria. All variables that had ap value of ^ .25 in the univariate
analysis were included in the regression model. The results in Table 14 indicate that only
one variable, the internal awareness score, entered into the model with a R2 of .062. Table
15 shows the variables that were excluded from the regression model.
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Table 15
Variables Included in the Model.
Variable

B

SE

fi

/

P

Internal Awareness

.129

.053

.248

2.433

0.17

B = The unstandardized coefficients, fi = The standardized coefficients
Table 16
Variables Excluded from the Model
Variable

13

t

P

College

-.066

-.628

.532

-.066

RN

-.052

-.487

.627

-.052

External Awareness -.084

-.810

.420

-.086

Yrs in ED Sqrt

.140

1.372

.173

.144

Age Sqrt

.038

.367

.715

.039

Agent Score

.042

.405

.687

.043

History Score

.184

1.823

.072

.190

# Hrs Trg last 2 yrs

.186

1.737

.086

.181

Worked in USA

-.179

-1.773

.080

-.185

Gender

.121

1.773

.244

.123

B = The standardized coefficients
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Partial Correlation

CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION
The overall state of the knowledge of Canadian ED clinicians with respect to
bioterrorism management is unknown due to the lack of previous studies on this topic.
With a credible threat to the Canadian population from a bioterrorist attack (Purver,
1995), a history of terrorists using biological agents to further their cause (USAMRIID,
2005), and the scientific availability of biological agents for which to use against a
population (Rotz et al., 2002), ED clinicians could be faced with a sizable situation for
which previous clinical experience poorly prepares them. With a professional mandate to
respond to such a crisis, formal preparedness for such an incident is critical. During a
bioterrorism incident one cannot fall back on past experiential learning acquired from
incidents to which they have been previously exposed.
This study explored the awareness (threat, agent, and historical use) and previous
training ED clinicians had in the field of bioterrorism. Specifically, it explored the core
competencies of decontamination, personal protection, and isolation, as they are critical
for the correct ED response to a bioterrorism attack. Fearing that ED clinicians would not
have all the answers in their memory, the types of immediate references that the clinician
would utilize to seek just-in-time information were also examined.
Overall, despite the low levels of formal or informal previous training, the lack of
historical knowledge of biological agent use, and poor awareness with respect to the type
of agents that may be employed by terrorist, study participants thought that a bioterrorism
attack was probable. They reported the notable probability of a bioterrorism attack was
not only in some distant part of Canada, but also in the city in which they work.
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Participants were also able to self-articulate the perception of poor personal and moderate
departmental preparedness for such an incident. This premonition was accurately
reflected by a lack of knowledge base in the core competencies of decontamination,
isolation, and personal protection. Upon examination of the factors influencing the
knowledge of health care providers concerning the management of bioterrorism victims,
only internal awareness was an independent predictor. That is, the knowledge of the ED
clinician may have been influenced by how prepared the clinician personally felt and how
prepared they felt their ED department was to respond to a bioterrorism attack.
Demographics
The distribution of the sample in this study was anecdotally similar to the
distribution of the ED staffing in Canada. The study population was composed of mostly
female participants and the average experience in emergency care was 8.6 years. RNs in
the sample were predominantly college educated (62.7%). Of the practicing clinicians, a
notable number had worked in an American ED (27.2%, n = 25). Surprisingly, the data
suggested that American work experience did not confer additional training, awareness,
or knowledge on the topic of bioterrorism, despite the recent (2002-2006) 6.1 billion
dollar expenditure by the American government to prepare their health care systems for
disasters such as bioterrorism (GAO, 2007).
Level of Training
On average, the data suggest that physicians have twice the bioterrorism
management training than nurses over the period of their career. Although training was
found to be higher in this study than that of Ghilarducci et al. (2000), no provincial or
national standard exists for what constitutes sufficient training. However, the CF nursing
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occupation provides 55 hours of bioterrorism training at the start of a nursing officers
career with a yearly (averaging 2.5 hours) refresher for all personnel (MND, 2000). The
quantity of this training is substantially increased for nursing officers who are expected to
be prepared to provide care to bioterrorism casualties. This standard is substantially
higher than the amounts of training reported by participants in this study.
The state of bioterrorism education within the sampled university nursing
program was dismal with a total average of 1.5 hours. This lack of bioterrorism education
finding is congruent with the finding of Markenson et al. (2005), who reported that very
few American schools provide any formal bioterrorism training within their curricula.
The importance of training in the fundamentals of emergency bioterrorism care while in
an undergraduate university program cannot be understated (Langan, Kater, & Aharoni,
2005), because it provides the foundations for further development and potentially
comprises a substantial amount of the total training a clinician will ever receive.
Although training is being conducted within the hospital settings, only one third of
participants reported receiving such training within the sample studied.
Access to Information
The findings suggest that in a crisis situation, information on how to manage the
bioterrorism emergency would be sought from a variety of sources internal and external
to the ED. Participants suggested that, within the ED, they are more likely to consult with
the departmental policy and procedure manual and seek advice on how to manage the
situation from the ED manager. These two sources for information are within the locus of
control of the ED and reinforce the importance of having an up to date bioterrorism
reference within the policy and procedure manual. It also highlights the importance of
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ensuring that key members of the leadership team are knowledgeable in the management
of a bioterrorism event. The Internet was also identified as a likely tool to which
participants would turn for information on how to manage the bioterrorism crisis. This
finding could prove to be problematic because the information contained within the
Internet is outside the control of the ED management and its content may not always be
valid. Use of the Internet will force the clinician to be very critical of the information
found and require scrutinizing for currency, authenticity, and applicability to the
presenting situation (NATO, 2001; Purcell, 2004). This task could prove to be difficult
for the clinician, faced with a stressful time sensitive crisis, who is unfamiliar with the
fundamental concepts of bioterrorism casualty management (Craigie, Loader, Burrows, &
Muncer, 2002). Having credible websites and resources bookmarked on ED computers
prior to an emergency can mitigate the hazard the Internet provides as a just-in-time
reference tool and fosters the rapid access to information (NATO, 2002).
Threat Awareness
The findings of this study suggest that almost all ED clinicians and nursing
students believe there is some probability of encountering a bioterrorism attack within
Canada in the next 10 years. The threat assessment with respect to probability of
occurrence within Canada was considerably higher by the participants than that openly
reported by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (Purver, 1995).
Despite the higher-than-real assessed probability of an attack, participants knew
little of past historical attacks or biological agents a terrorist may employ against a
population. The score on historical knowledge was lowest in students and highest in
physician respondents. Overall, participants were largely unaware of the largest (in terms
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of casualty yield) bioterrorism event (the 1984 Oregon restaurant attack), unaware of the
first threat of bioterrorism in North America (the 1972 Chicago typhoid water supply
plan), and unaware of the multiple attempts in the 1990s by the Aum Shinrikyo to attack
the Japanese population with biological agents. Study participants were largely aware of
a 2007 bioterrorism scare at a local ED and aware of the postal anthrax attacks that
affected the United States in 2001. These findings could be reflective of the change in
global terrorism awareness since 11 September 2001 (Michaels, 2002), where North
Americans are more concerned over threats and actions that terrorists could take against
them (Gartenstein-Ross, 2007; Millward, 1993). Another possibility could be attributed
to the theory of knowledge half-life (Machlup, 1962), which suggests that people are
more likely to be aware of information to which they have been recently exposed (such as
in news reports).
With respect to the knowledge of the biological agents that a terrorist is most
likely to use, participants once again scored poorly. Students had the lowest score, while
physicians had the highest score. Of greatest concern was the finding that most
participants were unaware that Lassa fever may be employed as a bioterrorism agent and
were unaware that highly infectious tularemia may be used as a weapon. Although the
awareness results for plague, smallpox, and botulism toxin were better, they were
disconcertingly low for clinicians responsible for a frontline response. The five agents
presented in this study comprise 71.4% of all agents considered to be of highest
likelihood to be used by a terrorist according to the CDC (Rotz et al. 2002). Without the
ability to know which agents might present in the ED after a bioterrorism attack, ED
clinicians cannot adequately detect, treat, or protect themselves from the infectious
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process (USAMRIID, 2005). In comparison to Chen et al. (2002) who examined
American family physicians awareness of bioterrorism agents, the findings of this study
were similar for tularemia, lower for smallpox, and higher for plague and botulism.
Knowledge
Knowledge pertaining to the key concepts of decontamination, personal
protection, and isolation were examined in this study. In general, the findings suggested
that knowledge of the participants was very low. The fact that participants not only
lacked knowledge in many situations, but were likely to select answers that will be of
counter productive nature was especially concerning. Once again, knowledge was found
to be lowest in students and highest in physicians, although the overall knowledge of the
sample was disconcertingly poor, regardless of profession.
With respect to knowledge of decontamination, the findings were somewhat
positive. Practicing clinicians articulated the need to decontaminate an obviously
contaminated casualty. Further, the large majority understood the importance of
decontaminating all casualties regardless of their injuries prior to admittance into the ED.
However, it is concerning that a group of physicians and nurses indicated that they would
admit a casualty requiring urgent medical treatment into the ED prior to decontamination.
A situation where a contaminated casualty gains admission to the ED prior to
decontamination is the worse case scenario (Levitin et al., 2003). This action
compromises the environmental safety of the ED infrastructure (possibly rendering the
ED closed for several months while structural decontamination is undertaken) and places
both clinicians and other patients in the ED at considerable risk of acquiring an infectious
disease (GAO, 2003). Practicing ED clinicians were most likely to over decontaminate
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casualties (that is, initiating decontamination when not required). While this is preferable
over under decontamination (that is, not decontaminating a casualty who requires
decontamination), it still presents problems in the overall management of biologically
contaminated casualties (Currance, 2005). These problems include a physical and
psychological risk to staff and patients by working in personal protective equipment
(NATO, 2004), the disruption of regular ED care, the cost of committing disposable
resources (United States Department of Justice, 2002), and the image portrayed to the
media. This study examined two situations where decontamination did not need to occur.
One was a small group of reliable patients (police officers) who were decontaminated on
scene by a reliable decontamination system (the fire department hazardous material
team), while the other was a patient who obviously did not require decontamination due
to his presenting story and possible agent of exposure. In the first case, very few of the
respondents would allow the police officers into the ED for medical examination, while
the majority would force a full second decontamination at the ED. In the second case,
few participants understood that this patient did not pose a risk to the ED and opted not to
decontaminate, while the majority would once again force this patient needlessly through
the decontamination process.
With respect to the practice of isolation, clinicians understood the importance of
isolating a bioterrorism casualty who presents with exposure to a potentially highly
contagious disease (in this case Ebola). Overall, practicing clinicians tended to over
estimate the need for isolation. The results show a lack of understanding of the facts that
decontamination most often negates the need for isolation (Veenema, 2007b), that ricin
exposure is not a condition for which isolation is warranted (USAMRIID, 2005), and that
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the technique of quarantining patients is not the standard of practice (Hoffman, 2003).
This lack of knowledge could result in unwarranted commitment of resources (isolation
rooms) and the potential of needlessly treating (such as in scenario three, see Appendix
A) casualties with traumatic injuries that need resuscitation in the isolation room.
Performing trauma resuscitation outside the resuscitation area (where all supplies are
located, drills are practiced, and space is optimally designed) could result in suboptimal
care (Huddy, 2002).
Participants scored the poorest with regard to the personal protection component
of knowledge. Once again, respondents universally over estimated the requirement for
PPE. In all but the last scenario, the respondents chose that they would use a "category C
protective garment" complete with air purifying mask to care for patients within the ED.
This was the highest level of protection offered and would involve the use of a full-face
air purifying respirator or powered air purifying respirator, chemical resistant clothing,
inner gloves, chemical resistant outer gloves taped to the suit, and chemical resistant
books with a steel toe and shank (Currance & Mailliard, 2005). This robust level of
protection is usually reserved for decontamination line personnel, especially those
involved in chemical (versus biological) agent decontamination (Dickens, 2002;
Veenema, 2007b). Multiple problems exist with over estimating the PPE requirement.
Physical and psychological performance degradation occurs when staff is burdened by
such levels of PPE resulting in a net decrease in the ability to provide care (NATO, 2004;
Veenema, 2007b). It is also possible that receiving care by hospital staff in "space-suits"
would have an adverse effect on the psychological well-being of the patient (Mason &
Lyons, 2003). Another issue would arise when staff members are not provided this level
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of protection (as the hospitals EDs do not have it), despite expectations that they be
protected in such a manner. Such situation could result in MD/RN refusal to work and
other human resource issues such as occupational health and safety claims and a stop
work order by a union (Veenema, 2007b). The issue of desiring a higher level of
protection for which to provide care is related to the misunderstanding of the
decontamination process, lack of knowledge that most biological agents are not
communicable, and the ability of self protection using commonly available infection
control PPE postures such as airborne, droplet, contact, and standard precautions.
Predictors of Knowledge
On examination of the factors associated with the knowledge of health care
providers in the ED concerning the management of the victims of bioterrorism, only
internal awareness was an independent predictor. This finding is congruent with that of
Chen et al. (2002) who reported that bioterrorism preparedness within American family
physicians was reflective of increased knowledge. This finding reinforces the logic that
people who think they are prepared are knowledgeable with respect to how to react, and
those who know they are not prepared most often know they lack knowledge in the given
area. Nonetheless, it was surprising that none of the other variables examined in the
model (for example, profession, external awareness, agent awareness, awareness of past
bioterrorism events, bioterrorism training, and having worked in the USA) were
significant.
With respect to training, one would hypothesize, based on the CF NBC
framework used for this study, that increased training would be an independent predictor
of knowledge. This hypothesis did not hold true as the minimal amounts of training
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reported by participants with regard to the fundamentals examined here
(decontamination, isolation, and personal protection) did not predict knowledge. Further
examination of this part of the conceptual framework should be conducted to discover if
this finding is a one-time occurrence or rather is a recurrent in other studies resulting in
the need for a revision of the framework.
Implications and Recommendations
The findings of this study add to the body of knowledge within disaster
preparedness, medical bioterrorism defence, and emergency nursing/medicine. They are
particularly relevant to the setting where the data was collected and should not be
generalized beyond these EDs. The overall low knowledge regarding how to respond to a
bioterrorism attack serves as a warning to planners, clinicians, policy makers, educators,
and managers that we are ill prepared to deal with the health consequences of a
bioterrorism attack.
Recommendations for Practice
This study reinforces the need identified by the USPHS (2004) for ED clinicians
to be competent in the management of bioterrorism casualties. As part of this
competency, managers must ensure that staff are cognizant of the risk of a bioterrorism
attack, biological agents that could be potentially used, how to decontaminate casualties
in a timely manner, and how to protect themselves and others from potentially infectious
situations. By ensuring that hospitals have knowledgeable teams of ED clinicians that are
prepared to manage victims of bioterrorism, the preparedness for future naturally caused
pandemics is simultaneously bolstered. It has been reported by Goldstein (2003) that the
American investment in biological terrorism preparedness allowed the rapid response to
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the 2003 SARS epidemic. To this avail, managers should train their staff on the topic of
bioterrorism, policy makers should fund training and incorporate minimal levels of
training into policy documents, and ED clinicians should seek out information on the
topic of bioterrorism in order to provide competent care to potential bioterrorism
casualties.
This study also suggests the need for ED managers, ED educators, and the
Medical Officer of Health to be experts on the topic of the management of bioterrorism
casualties. According to this study, ED staff will turn to these key players in the event of
a bioterrorism emergency for direction, advice, and procedural guidance. Given the
overall low level of knowledge on the subject, if these people are not knowledgeable, not
only may a leadership crisis ensue (MND, 2007), but the whole ED system may fail. The
study also suggests the need for the policy and procedure manual within the ED to have
clear, concise, and accurate guidelines on the management of bioterrorism casualties.
Recommendations for Teaching
This study supports the statements by Markenson et al. (2005) and the
International Nursing Coalition for Mass Casualty Education (2003) on the importance of
formally educating both nurses and physicians on the topic of bioterrorism. Given that
low levels of knowledge were reported within all professions in this study, it is evident
that the educational system is failing health care providers with respect to bioterrorism
education. All undergraduate medicine and nursing programs need to contain information
on the threat, historical precedence, and potential biological agents, and management of
bioterrorism victims. This hazard identification and risk analysis approach to disaster
management is well supported in the literature (Ciottone, 2006; Coppola, 2007).
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Subsequent to the understanding of the problems, students should be educated on the
fundamentals of response such as decontamination, isolation, and personal protection
from infectious agents. Such fundamental training should be expanded to graduate
programs, specialty training for ED clinicians, and professional maintenance of
competency training within the ED settings.
Recommendations for Research
Given that this was the first study to examine the knowledge of bioterrorism
management amongst ED clinicians, the findings need to be replicated before they can be
generalized. It would be useful to have this study conducted over multiple sites within
Canada in order to examine regional variance and gain a better understanding of the
overall preparedness for a bioterrorism attack. It also is recommended that research be
conducted on how the topics surrounding bioterrorism and infectious diseases are being
taught within medical and nursing undergraduate programs, and how comfortable new
graduates feel about applying these skills to practice. Finally, it is recommended that the
BAT be subjected to further testing to allow for the inclusion of a greater number of
questions that examine one situation. This would allow for a greater sampling of the
concepts, prevent one erroneous answer from discounting knowledge on a topic, and
ideally increase the ability to captures the essence of knowledge on this topic.
Limitations
A data collection technique that relies on self-report has the potential for response
bias (Burns & Grove, 2005). It is possible that respondents, despite being asked not to do
so in the introductory letter, spoke to their colleagues about the questions or looked up
the answers prior to submitting their results. Additionally, the study design prevents the
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declaration of any manner of causality. Although the descriptive methodology used in
this study served a distinct purpose, the underlying methodology nonetheless remains a
limitation to the advancement of the science. Future study methodologies should take this
into account in order to advance the state of knowledge within this topic.
The BAT was a new research survey created specifically for this research.
Although great care was taken to psychometrically validate it prior to use, limitations
may be present in any new tool when it is first used. There is a risk that the BAT did not
fully capture the maximum level of variance with respect to awareness and knowledge.
Future mitigation of this risk can come with repeated use of the tool, further
psychometric validation, and revision if required.
Conclusion
The risk of another bioterrorism attack occurring and need for Canadian ED
clinicians to provide care to those affected is probable. Despite having EDs that are
centres for excellence for emergency care, the sample was not prepared to deal with the
casualties that are resultant from a bioterrorist attack. This lack of preparedness is directly
impacted by the lack of awareness and knowledge among ED clinicians with respect to
management of bioterrorism casualties. The risk of poorly responding to a bioterrorism
event is compounded by the fact that education on the topic of bioterrorism casualty
management does not provide students with the fundamental required knowledge. By
increasing the level of awareness and knowledge with respect to bioterrorism casualty
management, we can deter the use of biological agents by terrorists and better serve
patients who seek assistance after an attack has occurred.
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APPENDIX: Questionnaire Sample
Awareness and knowledge of bioterrorism management amongst emergency
department clinicians: An exploratory descriptive study
Demographics and Characteristics
1- Profession

2- Highest Level of School COMPLETED

• MD
• RN / RN(EC)
D 4th Year Nursing Student

• High School
• College
• University

3- Gender

4- What is your age in years?

• Female

^^^

• Male

5- Certification (if any)

• FRCPC / FRCSC

D CCFP(EM) • CCFP

• ENC(C) / CEN

• CIC

Nursing Students, please skip to question # 9
6- How many years have you been practicing in your profession?
years
7- How many years have you been practicing in the field of emergency medicine / nursing?
years
8- Have you worked full or part time in an American hospital in the past 5 years?
• No
• Yes
9- Estimate the total number of hours of education and/or training you have received in the area
of biological terrorism. Estimated number of hours:
10- Estimate the number of hours of education and/or training you have had in the past 2 years in
the area of biological terrorism.
hours
11-1 have received training in biological terrorism from (check all that apply):
D University / College courses
• Government courses
• Internet courses
• Conferences
• In-hospital training
• Journals / Books
• Internet reading
• Other, please specify:
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12- If you required information while managing a biological terrorism situation in the emergency
department, you would look (check all that apply):
• In a textbook
• In the policy and procedures manual
• On the Internet
• On your PDA
• you would telephone a colleague whom you trust
• You would telephone the emergency nurse educator
• You would telephone the emergency department manager
• You would phone the infectious diseases physician on call
• You would phone the Medical Officer of Health at the Health Unit
• Other
Bioterrorism Assessment Tool - Part I
Awareness of the Threat of Bioterrorism
1-1 feel the probability that Canada will be affected by a biological terrorism incident in the next
10 years is:
• It will not happen • Low • Moderate • High • Certain it will happen
2-1 feel the probability of my city being affected by a biological terrorism incident in the next 10
years is:
• It will not happen

• Low

• Moderate

• High

• Certain it will happen

3- The level of preparedness I have to respond to a biological terrorism incident is:
• Not prepared • Low • Moderate • High • Fully Prepared
4- The level of preparedness my emergency department has to respond to a biological terrorism
incident is:
• Not prepared D Low • Moderate • High D Fully Prepared
5- Please identify all of the following actual or threatened incidents of bioterrorism that you are
aware of (check all that apply):
•
•
•
•
D

Chicago (O'Hare) Airport find
Toronto Chinatown laboratory find
Oregon restaurant attack
Chicago city water attack plan
Japanese cult (Aum Shinrikyo) attacks

•
•
•
•
•

Sydney Olympic Games scare
Hotel-Dieu ED envelope scare
Ottawa Canada Day incident
American postal mail attacks
New York supermarket attack plan

6- Please identify all of the following diseases that pose a HIGH threat of use as a biological
terrorism agent (check all that apply):
•
•
•
D

Dengue
Human immunodeficiency virus
Smallpox
Lassa Fever

•
•
•
•

•

Polio

•

Plague
Botulism Toxin
Leishmaniasis
Tularemia
Yellow Fever
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Bioterrorism Assessment Tool - Part II
Knowledge of Bioterrorism Emergency Care
Number 1:
A senior federal government official in a local office opened a package at his desk. Inside this package
was an unknown quantity of a fine white powder. A letter inside the package indicated this powder was
Ebola, and the person who opened the package was going to die. The official reports to your emergency
department (by car) in a panic.
Please select the BEST answer for the following questions:
Which (one) of the following statements is true regarding removal of the agent from this person?
• No decontamination needs to take place, as the alleged biological agent is not on the person.
• Removal of clothes as soon as possible after entering the emergency department.
• A shower with hot water and soap in the emergency department.
D A full decontamination outside of the emergency department.
After the response taken above, this patient should be initially triaged into what area?
• The resuscitation area for immediate evaluation and possible stabilization.
• The waiting room, as the patient is not ill and not at risk of spreading the disease.
• The isolation room, as the patient could be contagious.
• Another area within the emergency department for further evaluation.
What type of infection control precautions must staff use while caring for this patient in the
emergency department?
• Standard (gloves, gown, mask, and eye protection when appropriate).
• Airborne (standard precautions plus the wearing of N95 respiratory protection).
• Droplet (standard precautions and wearing a mask when within 3 feet of the patient).
• Contact (standard precautions with gloves and gowns).
• Special (standard precautions with a powered air purifying mask, and resistant (category C).
protective garment
Number 2
A global trade organization meeting is taking place in your city. This activity has resulted in large
protests. During one of these protests a group of four police officers are sprayed with an unknown liquid.
Fearing it may be chemical or biological in nature they remove themselves from the containment line
and are decontaminated by the on-site hazardous materials team. Despite being asymptomatic, as part of
the police protocol they are brought to your facility (with notice of arrival) for examination,
documentation, and treatment.
Please select the best answer for the following questions:
These police officers require:
• No decontamination needs to take place, as the hazardous materials team did it.
• Removal of clothes as soon as possible after entering the emergency department.
• A shower with hot water and soap in the emergency department.
D A full decontamination outside of the emergency department.
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After the response taken above, these patients should be triaged into what area?
• The resuscitation area for immediate evaluation and possible stabilization.
• The outside, pending the evaluation by a biological detector to confirm they are clean of agent.
• Into one isolation room, as the patients could be contagious from biological agent exposure.
• Another area within the emergency department for further evaluation.
What type of infection control precautions must staff use while caring for these patients in the
emergency department?
• Standard (gloves, gown, mask, and eye protection when appropriate).
• Airborne (standard precautions plus the wearing of N95 respiratory protection).
• Droplet (standard precautions and wearing a mask when within 3 feet of the patient).
• Contact (standard precautions with gloves and gowns).
• Special (standard precautions with a powered air purifying mask, and resistant (category C
protective garment).
Number 3
A parade is occurring downtown in celebration of an important event. Despite some of the controversy
over this event a large crowd turns out on this sunny day in order to celebrate. There is an explosion and
many people in the crowd are injured from the blast. For reasons not totally clear, the on-site emergency
services commander feels this might be a conventional bombing with a chemical or biological agent
release occurring at the same time. He activates the city emergency plan, and your emergency
department is notified that decontamination operations are being set up on scene and casualties will be
sent to your department. Five minutes later, people start arriving by taxi and personal car at your front
door. Some of them look quite injured and are in physical distress.
Please select the best answer for the following questions:
These people require:
• No decontamination needs to take place, as the hazardous materials team is on the scene, and is in
control of decontamination operation for this situation.
• No decontamination, as the likelihood of biological contamination is non-existent.
• No decontamination for the urgent / emergent casualties, as they cannot wait. All others will
have their clothes removed and have a hot, soapy shower.
• A full decontamination outside of the emergency department for all casualties, regardless of the
nature of their injuries.
After the response taken above, the patients with serious trauma should be triaged into what area:
• The resuscitation area for immediate evaluation and possible stabilization.
• The outside, due to the possibility of biological off-gassing through the wounds.
• Into one isolation room, as the patients could be contagious from biological agent exposure.
• Another area within the hospital which will be designated a "quarantined area".

PLEASE CHECK THAT ALL ITEMS YOU WISH TO FILL IN ARE COMPLETE
AND THEN TURN THE PAGE

84

What type of infection control precautions must staff use while caring for these patients in the
emergency department?
• Standard (gloves, gown, mask, and eye protection when appropriate).
• Airborne (standard precautions plus the wearing of N95 respiratory protection).
• Droplet (standard precautions and wearing a mask when within 3 feet of the patient).
• Contact (standard precautions with gloves and gowns).
• Special (standard precautions with a powered air purifying mask, and resistant (category C)
protective garment.
Number 4
A Canadian Border Security Agency Customs Officer arrives at your triage desk. He informs you that he
fells "unwell" with general malaise, nausea, and a headache. He notes his illness began sometime after
his shift at the border. He noted that during work today he was in contact with an unknown brown
powder in a shipment he was inspecting. Not thinking anything of it at the time, the shipment was
cleared to pass into Canada. When he mentioned this to his wife (who is a biologist) she was concerned
that he may have come into contact with Ricin (a biological agent), and this might be the cause of his
presenting illness. When questioned about his activities after work he informs you he has changed his
clothes, had a shower, ate dinner, and had a nap before coming to the emergency department.
Please select the best answer for the following questions:
This gentleman requires:
• No decontamination needs to take place, as the possible exposure took place 12 hours ago and
he has since changed and showered at home.
D Removal of clothes as soon as possible upon entering the emergency department.
• A shower with hot water and soap in the emergency department.
• A full decontamination outside of the emergency department.
After the response taken above, this person should be triaged into what area?
• The resuscitation area for immediate evaluation and possible stabilization.
• The outside, due to the possibility of Ricin off-gassing through the respiratory system.
• The isolation room, as the patient could be contagious from biological agent exposure.
• Another area within the emergency department for further evaluation.
What type of infection control precautions must staff use while caring for this patient in the
emergency department?
D Standard (gloves, gown, mask, and eye protection when appropriate).
• Airborne (standard precautions plus the wearing of N95 respiratory protection).
• Droplet (standard precautions and wearing a mask when within 3 feet of the patient).
• Contact (standard precautions with gloves and gowns).
• Special (standard precautions with a powered air purifying mask, and resistant (category C)
protective garment.
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